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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the market, political and financial
feasibility of constructing a multifamily rental housing
project on a site in Central Square, Cambridge,
Massachusetts. The site is presently owned by a local
developer.
First, the author describes the site and demographic and
housing characteristics of the surrounding neighborhoods.
Second, the current demand in the Cambridge housing market
is analyzed, and potential users and rent levels are
established. Third, the author outlines the public approval
process and those obstacles which must be overcome by the
developer. Fourth, the financial feasibility of the project
is analyzed. When the project is found to be economically
infeasible with private financing, a range of public
financing alternatives are identified and described. The
financial returns to the developer are analyzed and compared
to the limitations imposed on the project by these
financing sources. The author concludes that the developer
must utilize public financing to achieve financial
feasibility.
Thesis Advisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Assistant Professor of Planning and
Real Estate Development
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the market,
political and financial feasibility of constructing a
multifamily rental housing project on a privately owned site
in the Central Square neighborhood of Cambridge,
Massachusetts. The owner of the site, a local developer, is
confronted with numerous obstacles which makes development
of this project particularly difficult. The thesis will
identify these obstacles, as well as suggest strategies to
overcome them.
Chapter One will describe the site, adjacent land uses
and the demographic and housing charactersitics of the
surrounding neighborhoods. In addition, preliminary
architectural plans for the project will be outlined.
Chapter Two will analyze the market potential for the
project by first identifying the demand generated by a
declining supply of privately-owned rental housing. Market
comparables for the project will be described, as well as
the perception of the site by local brokers.
Chapter Three will focus on the political feasibility
of the project, specifically the response of local residents
and the impact of rent control laws on long term projections
of financial feasibility. Lastly, Chapter Four will analyze
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the financial feasibility of the project. The risks and
rewards of the project will be identified, utilizing
conventional and participation financing. When the project
is found to be economically infeasible with private
financing, a range of public sector financing alternatives
will be identified and described. The financial returns to
the developer will be compared to the limitations imposed on
the project by utilizing public sector financing. Chapter
Five concludes by recommending that the developer undertake
the project if he is willing to assume the risks inherent in
the process of competing for scarce public finnacing.
EXISTING CONDITION OF SITE
The site of the proposed rental housing project is a
25,000 square foot parcel located in the Central Square
neighborhood of Cambridge, Massachussetts. It is within one
block of the intersection of Prospect Street and
Massachussetts Avenue and is bounded by Prospect, Bishop
Allen and Essex Streets.
The site is presently used as a parking lot for tenants
of three office buildings located nearby. These office
buildings contain apporximately 176,000 square feet and
comprise the largest cluster of office buildings in Central
Square. Additional parking for the office buildings is also
provided on a lot located on the western edge of Prospect
6
Street (see Exhibit 1). These lots presently accomodate 300
cars. [1]
The cluster of office buildings and the two parking
lots located on the east and west side of Prospect Street
were recently purchased as a package by a local developer,
Central Plaza Realty Trust (CPRT). The development plan of
CPRT is to convert the parking lot located on the west side
of Prospect Street into a three story garage which will
provide covered parking for the tenants of the office
buildings locates nearby. In order to ensure the economic
feasibility of the garage, the developer also intends to
construct a total of 80,000 square feet of office space on
two floors above the garage. The construction of the garage
would subsequently make the subject parcel, located directly
adjacent to the garage on the east side of Prospect,
available for development.
The developer is actively considering development of
the site into rental housing or condominiums. The local
government as well as community groups would like to see the
site developed as housing. In exchange for providing rental
housing which fulfills a community need, the developer would
like to secure a zoning amendment for the parcel on the
western side of Prospect in order to construct the proposed
three story garage and two additional stories of office
space. At the present time, a portion of the parcel on the
western side of Prospect is located in a Residence C-1
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Zoning District , which generally limits permitted uses to
residential housing. If the municipality agrees to change
the zoning designation from Residence C-1 to a Business B
Designation, the developer can proceed with the proposed
parking and office structure. The site of the proposed
housing project is located in a Business A, Residence B and
Business A-1 District. Residential housing is a permitted
use in all three of those Districts.[2]
As percieved by the developer, the two projects are
closely interrelated and, in all likelihood, will not
proceed independently from one another.
SITE CONTEXT
Central Square is a retail and shopping area which
provides services to adjacent residential communities as
well as the student population of Harvard and MIT. As a
result of the proximity of the site to Central Square, the
surrounding land uses are predominately commercial in
nature.
Prospect Street borders the eastern edge of the site
and is heavily trafficked, as numerous trucks exit the
Massachusetts Turnpike at the edge of the adjacent
neighborhood, Cambridgeport, and travel down Prospect Street
towards Somerville. Structures on Prospect Street within one
block of the subject site include a Bread and Circus grocery
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store; the offices of an architectural firm, ADD Inc.; and
small, neighborhood-oriented commercial facilities. The
southern edge of the site faces Bishop Allen Drive and the
rear entrance to Woolworth's Department Store. The entrance
appears to be used primarily for loading purposes and is
poorly maintained. A cluster of
intersection of Essex Stree
adjacent to the eastern edge of
have been renovated into small
not-for-profit organizations.
is bounded by Essex Street.
townhouses is located at the
t and Bishop Allen Drive,
the site. These townhouses
offices and contain numerous
The eastern edge of the site
The street is essentailly
residential in character, and is dominated
family houses. The backyards and rear ent
two-and-three family houses on Essex St
northern edge of the site. (see Exhibit 1.)
Although a physical inspection of the
that its surroundings are predominately
nature, there are several features which
appropiate for residential. It is within one
by two-and-three
rances of these
reet form
site indic
commercial
make the
block of an
the
ates
in
site
MTA
station, which is presently being extensively renovated. The
site is also within one block of numerous bus routes which
travel to downtown Boston and Harvard Square. Shopping
facilities such as grocery, drug and clothing stores are
conveniently located in Central Square. In addition, the
Square contains numerous inexpensive, ethnic restaurants
which serve the students of MIT and Harvard.
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DESCRIPTION OF NEIGHBORHOOD
The marketability of a rental or condominium project
is, in large part, subject to the image of the surrounding
neighborhoods. The common perception of Central Square is a
neighborhood dominated by lower income persons and
substandard housing. The task for the developer is to
understand how this perception is formulated and whether the
perception is an accurate reflection of the demographics of
the Square and adjacent neighborhoods. A marketing strategy
can subsequently be developed which acknowledges existing
economic conditions while emphasizing those aspects of the
neighborhood which appeal to upper-income groups.
As Exhibit 2 indicates, the site of the proposed
housing project is surrounded by two neighborhoods defined
by the Cambridge Planning Department as Neighborhood Four
and Neighborhood Five. The site is actually located in
Neighborhood Four, which is the eastern section of the area
commonly known as Mid-Cambridge. The site is one block from
Massachusetts Avenue, the nothern boundary of Neighborhood
Five. That neighborhood is known to city residents as
Cambridgeport.
Using data from the 1980 Census, the city has compiled
a profile of the households residing in these two
neighborhoods. In addition, the city has analyzed the
existing housing stock. The demographic picture of these two
neighborhoods is outlined below.
Family and Income Characteristics
The following table summarizes the family and income
characteristics of Neighborhoods Four and Five, as well as
the city of Cambridge.
Table 1:Demographic Characteristics of Project Market Area
Characteristic Area #4 Area #5 City
Number of Persons 6,532 8,670 95,322
Number of minorities
as a % of pop. 50% 22% 18%
Percentage of persons
under 15 years 22% 13% 13%
Percentage of persons
over 65 years 9.6% 13% 11%
Median Family Income $11,073 $15,474
Percentage of Persons
Below Poverty Level 27% 17% 11%
Percentage of Families
headed by single women 46% 32% 24%
Average size of Families
w/children under 18 3.21 3.07 3.03
Source: Cambridge Department of Housing and Community
Development
As the demographics above clearly indicate,
Neighborhood Four contains a greater number of minorities,
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young persons and large families headed by single women than
either Neighborhood Five or the city as a whole. As a
result, the median family income of Neighborhood Four is
significantly lower than the income level of Neighborhood
Five or the city as a whole. In addition, the poverty rate
of Neighborhood Four is 59% higher than the adjacent
Neighborhood Five.
Housing Characteristics
The following chart summarizes the characteristics of
the housing stock for these two neighborhoods, as well as
for the city overall.
Table 2: Housing Characteristics of Project Market Area
CHARACTERISTIC
Number of Occupied
Units
Percentage Owner
Occupied
Percentage Renter
Occupied
Percentage Constructed
prior to 1940
Percentage of
Subsidized Units
Area #4
2,447
15%
85%
81%
20%
Source: Cambridge Department of
Development
Housing and Community
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Area #5
4,012
19%
81%
72%
15%
City
38,836
23%
77%
68%
11%
The percentage of owner occupied units in Neighborhood
Four is only half of the city-wide average. In addition, the
percentage of subsidized units is almost twice the overall
rate for the city. Not suprisingly, these housing statistics
mirror the family and income demographics described above.
In summary, Neighborhood Four is poorer and more
deteriorated than the majority of neighborhoods in the city.
DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED PROJECT
A successful development plan for the site must
acknowledge the social and physical profile of these two
neighborhoods. The site is not buffered from the impact of
these neighborhoods, particularly Neighborhood Four. The
range of development alternatives must be narrowed, and the
users who will feel comfortable with the social environment
must be identified.
The developer has therefore concluded that a luxury
rental or condominium project is not feasible, given the
predominance of lower-income persons and older housing. In
addition, the developer determined that the predominance of
commercial uses on adjacent parcels and relatively small
size of the parcel makes the alternative of townhouse
developement unattractive.[3] The only residential
alternative remaining is a multi-family, mid-rise rental or
condominium project.
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As a result, the developer retained an architectural
firm, ADD, who has developed a preliminary design for a
rental or condomimium project. The plan calls for the
construction of two residential buildings joined by a
courtyard. The building directly adjacent to Propect Street
is five stories, and the building which borders on Essex
Street is four stories. The gross square footage of the
building, as presently designed, is 47,400 square feet. The
exterior of the building will be fireproof brick
construction and from a design perspective, will emulate the
brick townhouses which face Essex Street to the east.[4]
The plan for the buildings has individual units laid
out along a single corridor in each building, with elevators
in both buildings. The buildings contain 36 two-bedroom
units of approximately 905 square feet and nine one-bedroom
units of approximately 660 square feet. The developer plans
to create what is commomnly defined as a "b+" unit.
Specifically, the units will contain wood floors, modern
kitchens with a dishwasher, disposal and high-quality
cabinets and access to balconies through a double glass
door. The two- bedroom units will include two bathrooms. At
the present time, the developer plans to meter all of the
utilities individually to the tenants. Finally, the
architect has also designed one level of parking underneath
the building, which will be accessible by car from a six
foot ramp and by elevator from the residential units. A
14
total of 45 parking spaces will be provided.
While the architect has developed preliminary plans,
the developer has not determined whether the project should
be developed for the rental or condominium market, or
identified appropiate rent levels or sale prices. The next
chapter will discuss current trends in the Cambridge housing
market, as well identify an appropiate user and rent level
for the project, as presently. Chapter Four will
subsequently anaylze the economic feasibility of building a
rental housing project on the subject site, given the
recommended rent levels and cost of construction.
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CHAPTER TWO
CURRENT TRENDS IN THE CAMBRIDGE HOUSING MARKET
In order to identify the appropiate rental or
condominium market for the subject site, the overall trends
in the Cambridge rental and homeownership markets must first
be analyzed. The table below summarizes the changes that
have occured in these markets between 1970 and 1980.
Table 3: Changes in the Cambridge Market 1970 to 1980
Housing Characteristics 1970
Number of Occupied Units 36,411
Number of Privately Owned 27,143
Renter-Occupied Units
Percentage Change from (6%)
1970 to 1980
Number of Subsidized Units 2278
Percentage Change from 97%
1970 to 1980
Number of Owner Occupied Units 6990
Percentage Change from 27%
1907 to 1980
Number of Conversions from 1983
Private Rental to Condominium
Number of Conversions as a 7.3%
Percentage of Private Rental Units
Source: Cambridge Department of Housing
Development
1980
38,836
25,484
4463
8889
and Community
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These figures indicate that the growth in the privately
owned housing market has occured exclusively in the owner-
occupied , as opposed to renter-occupied, sector. Although
the number of occupied units increased by 7% during the
1970s, the number of privately owned rental units decreased
by 6.1%. This decline can be attributed, in part, to the
significant number of conversions during the decade. A total
of 1983 units, or 7.3% of the existing rental units in 1970,
were converted into condominiums.
As a result of the absolute decrease in the city's
private rental stock, the vacancy rate has remained low
throughout the 1970s. In 1970, the city's vacancy rate was
equal to 3.3%. In 1980, the vacancy rate had risen to six
percent. While a variety of factors have precipitated this
increase, the existence of stringent rent control
regulations during the decade has encouraged some landlords
to keep their rental units off the market. In addition, a
number of units for rent or sale were inaccurately priced
for the market, and additional subsidized units were vacant
while undergoing renovation.[5] In light of these factors,
city officals revise the figure of 6% downward, and suggest
that a vacancy rate of between 1.5 and 3 percent more
accurately reflects the housing market.[6]
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FACTORS AFFECTING MARKET TRENDS
A variety of factors have caused the decline in the
number of privately owned rental units. From the perspective
of local officals, the decline is attributable to the
economic infeasibility of constructing new rental housing in
a densely settled urban area with increasing land values
such as Cambridge.[7] They suggest that the increase in
rents have not kept pace with the increasing cost of
residential construction. They also suggest that alternative
development opportunities, such as conversion or
construction of condominiums or office buildings, are more
profitable and yield a higher return to the developer than
rental housing. They point out that, in a market such as
Cambridge, the tax advantages of homeownership, when
combined with the potential of substantial appreciation,
yield a much higher return to the purchaser than a "high-
end" or luxury rental unit.
From the perspective of brokers, the decline in the
number of rental units is, in part, attributable to the
factors discussed above. However, they focus on the
stringent rent control laws as the primary explanation for
the decline in the number of renter-occupied housing
units.[8] The city's Rent and Eviction Control Enabling Act
of 1969 places strict limits on the rent levels, increases
and the scope of improvements which can implemented by a
20
landlord. Out of a total of 25,484 privately-owner rental
units, 58% or 15,000 units are under the jurisdiction of
rent control.[9]
These brokers also point to the number of conversions
which occured during the 1970s as evidence of the negative
impact of rent control laws on the city's housing market. As
was stated above, 7.3% of the privately owner rental units
were converted to condominiums during the 1970s. As a result
of the moratorium on conversions passed by the City Coucil
in August 1979, the number of recent conversions has
declined dramatically.
NEWLY CONSTRUCTED RENTAL HOUSING
Since the early seventies, the only new construction
projects undertaken by the private sector in the city of
Cambridge have been heavily subsidized by a variety of
government housing programs. The most recently constructed
rental project that contains any market rate units is
located at 808 Memorial Drive and was completed in 1976.
Composed of 301 units, the project was financed with tax-
exempt financing through the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency, in conjunction with low- interest permanent
financing provided through HUD's Section 236 program. Only
81 units in the building are defined as "market rate", in so
far as the tenants of these units are not subject to income
restrictions under the Section 236 program. The rents for
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these market rate units are $615 for a two-bedroom and $750
for a three bedroom, inclusive of heat and hot water.
Similar to other MHFA projects, the equity return to the
developer is limited to 6%.[10]
The only other activity in the new construction rental
market is a project presently under construction in Central
Square. Undertaken by the Winn Development Company, the
project is located at the intersection of Western Avenue and
River Street. When completed, the-ten story building will
contain a total of 85 units, several levels of parking and
approximately 3000 square feet of commercial space.[11] The
project will provide 23 units affordable to low and moderate
income persons, comprised of four three-bedroom units and 19
two-bedroom units. The balance of market rate units will be
composed of 8 three bedroom and 54 two- bedroom units. The
cost per unit is equal to $120,000, of which $50,000 will be
subsidized through HUD's Housing Development Action Grant
program and the SHARP program implemented by the state's
Executive Office of Communities and Development. The
developer projects to rent the units for an average of $850
per month for a two bedroom unit, inclusive of heat and hot
water and $1,000 for a three bedroom unit. Structured
parking will be available for an additonal $60 per month.
It is important to recognize that the subsidy package
available to the developer, Winn, cannot be secured at the
present time and, in light of the priority given rental
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housing by the Reagan Administration, will not be available
in the future. The depth of this subsidy significantly
reduces the market risk undertaken by the developer, and ,
in the opinion of the author, may not adequately define the
upper limits of the newly constructed rental housing market
in the Central Square neighborhood. Both MHFA and the
developer used rental buildings under the jurisdiction of
the Rent Control Board as comparables to establish rent
limits. Because these comparables are artifically
controlled, they may not provide an accurate "reading" of
the market demand for housing in the Central Sqaure
neighborhood.
MARKET COMPARABLES
As was discussed above, the supply of rental housing in
Cambridge has decreased over the last ten years. In
addition, approximately 15,000 units, or 58% of the total
number of privately owner rental housing units, are under
the jurisdiction of rent control. Significantly, these
include all multi-family rental properties larger than three
units and constructed prior to 1969 fall under the
jurisdiction of rent control. As a result, there are few
properties in the Cambridge market which can serve as
accurate comparables for the proposed 45-unit project.
The majority of projects appropriate as comparables
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fall into the following three categories: 1) condominium
units purchased by investors and currently rented; 2) rental
units located in deregulated areas adjacent to Central
Square such as Somerville and 3) units owned by institutions
such as Harvard available to students and employees. As
Exhibit Three indicates, the market comparables drawn from
these three categories range from $500 to $760 for a one
bedroom and $700 to $1000 for a two bedroom. On the basis of
these comparables, the average rent for a one bedroom is
equal to $630 and $850 for a two bedroom.
There are specific drawbacks associated with using
these comparables. The units located in Somerville are in an
inferior location with poor transportation access to Harvard
Square and downtown Boston. The units available through
Harvard are limited to persons studying or working for the
institution and, as such, Harvard has an incentive to keep
the housing affordable. In addition, many of the Harvard
units are located in superior areas of Cambridge. Lastly,
the number of condominium units currently rented are limited
as well as technically under the jurisdiction of the Rent
Control Board.
MARKET DEMAND AS PERCIEVED BY BROKERS
In light of the dearth of accuarte comparables, one
must look to the privately owned, unregulated rental stock
to provide an indication of demand and thereby an achievable
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range of rent levels for the proposed project. In order to
secure this data, the author interviewed four brokers active
in the Cambridge market.[12) The brokers were first
provided with an overall description of the quality, size
and exterior and interior finishes of the project (as
described in Chapter One). Subsequently, the brokers
provided the author with their analysis of the image, market
demand and projected rent levels for Central Square.
Image of Central Square
These brokers believe that while the demand for rental
housing in Cambridge is extremely strong, the image of
Central Square continues to be poor and has the effect of
depressing rent levels. The Central Sqaure neighborhood is
divided into a number of submarkets, including those
portions of Cambridgeport (Neighborhood Five) and Mid-
Cambridge (Neighborhood Four) which border on the Central
Sqaure commercial district. These brokers point out that
certain sections of these submarkets, particularly
Neighborhood Four, are not strong residential markets given
the predominance of lower-income persons and substandard
housing. However, because these neighborhoods are more
residential in character, rental and condominium units can
command higher prices than housing which is, as descibed by
one broker, "smack in the middle" of Central Square. The
brokers believe that there is a great deal of "market
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resistance" to this location one block from the intersection
of Massachusetts Avenue and Prospect Street.
Brokers are encouraged by the ongoing renovation of the
Central Square subway station. However, they do not see
enough signs to believe that a significant and long-term
improvement is underway which could alter the area's image.
In their opinoin, the area could undergo a significant
revitalization, which would mean a safer, more ameniable
environment for a moderate-or middle-income renter or
homebuyer. Alternatively, the area could continue in its
present function as a service area to low-income residents,
and the present problems of crime, loitering and marginal
commercial establishments would remain. The brokers believe
that the area has the potential to move in either direction
and are not willing to make any predictions about trends in
the area for the next three to four years.
Identifying the Market for the Project
- The brokers believe that the most suitable market for
this type of rental housing project would include students
at MIT and Harvard and young professionals who work in
downtown Boston, Harvard Square or Kendall Square. The
brokers were divided on the question of whether these groups
would be willing to live in Central Square and pay the rents
necessary to finance debt service and operating expenses for
a newly construction project. A number of the brokers cited
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the accessibility of the Square to downtown Boston, Kendall
Square, MIT and Harvard. In their opinion, the declining
supply of affordable rental and condominium housing will
make this project more competitive and mitigate against the
poor image of its location. The alternative view provided by
other brokers is that, with the exception of students,
persons who can afford to pay rents in the range of $650-800
for a one bedroom and $800-1000 for a two bedroom do not
want to live in the heart of Central Square. They would
prefer to find housing in more desirable locations or
purchase a small, "starter" condominium and gain the tax
advantages of homeownership. Essentially, they do not
believe that the overall housing shortage will significantly
offset the image of Central Square.
According to these brokers, rents in the Central Square
neighborhood range from $500 to $750 for a one bedroom and
$650 to $1000 for a two bedroom, depending on the location,
age of the unit and quality of construction. In contrast,
in more desirable locations in Cambridge, the rents for a
two bedroom range from $1000 to $1200. The poor image of
Central Square translates into a discount of approximately
$200 per month in the rent for a two bedroom apartment. The
brokers suggested that a rent of $650-700 per month for a
one bedroom and $800-900 per month for a two bedroom,
exclusive of utilities, is the top of the market at the
present time for a newly constructed, "b+" quality rental
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project at the proposed site.
CONDOMINIUM MARKET
According to these brokers, the condominium market in
the Central Square neighborhood at the present time is in
the price range of $100 per square foot for "b+" quality
units. Similar to their discussion of the rental market,
these brokers cite the poor image of the Square as a
negative influence on condominium prices. The price range
for one bedroom and two bedroom condominium units is $85,000
to $95,000 and $120,000 to $140,000 respectively. These
brokers suggest that, as the supply of single and
multifamily housing continues to decline, virtually all of
the first time homebuyers will be pushed into the
condominium market, which will cause prices for condominiums
to rise. The increasing demand for these units will mitigate
against the poor image of Central Square and the market for
"starter" condominiums in the price range of $100,000 to
$150,000 in this location will become stronger.
As a result, a number of these brokers suggested that
the subject site should be developed initially as rental
housing and converted into condominiums in five to ten
years. In their opinion, the developer will be able to
realize a substantial gain upon sale given the
revitalization of the Square and the ongoing appreciation of
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residential property. They suggest that the market for
condominiums at this site will be stronger in five to ten
years, given the dwindling supply of condominiums and the
present prohibition against conversion of rent controlled
property into condominiums.
CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDED MARKET AND RENT LEVELS
The perspective of these brokers supports the
conclusions reached at the end of Chapter One, namely that
the poor image of the Square has a signifiacnt impact on
the marketability of the proposed project. Nevertheless,
given the overwhelming demand for rental housing, the
project can be a success if the potential renter and rent
levels are carefully identified. On the basis of field
research, the author makes the following recommendations:
1) Graduate students and short term faculty at MIT
represent a strong market for the project. In addition,
young professionals who work in the Kendall Square area will
appreciate the convenience of the project's location. These
two groups should be targeted, as they will be less
concerned with the Square's negative image.
2) Projected rent levels should reflect the location of
the site as one block from the Square's commercial center.
The author therefore recommends that rent levels be set at
existing average rents, which approximate $650 for a one-
29
bedroom and $800 for a two-bedroom unit. These figures will
be trended upward to the estimated date of construction
completion.
While the author is confident that the project can
achieve full occupancy given these rent levels, the
political and financial feasibility of the project has not
been established. The next chapter will analyze the
political approval process, and the obstacles that the
developer confronts in his efforts to secure project
approval. Chapter Four will analyze the feasibility of the
project using both private and public financing sources.
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CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
During the last decade, Cambridge has acquired a
reputation as a city that does not welcome new development.
The public approval process appears to be highly
politicized. Given this reputation, the political
feasibility of a rental housing project at the proposed site
in Central Square must be carefully examined and, if
possible, a strategy must be formulated to respond to the
concerns of city officals, City Coucillors and residents of
the adjacent neighborhoods.
The role of the municipality in the development of this
rental housing project will be significant. The concerns of
local officials and residents will center around three
issues: 1) the provision of a zoning amendment necessary to
proceed with the overall project; 2) the applicability of
rent control laws to the project and 3) the impact of the
project on the adjacent neighborhoods.
ZONING ISSUES
While zoning regulations define a multi-family rental
housing project as an allowable use, the developer wishes to
tie developement on this parcel to new developement on the
adjacent parcel on the western side of Prospect Street. As
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was discussed in Chapter 1, the developer wishes to develop
a parking garage and 80,000 sqaure feet of office space on
the parking lot on the west side of Prospect Street,
directly across from the site of the proposed housing
project. While a parking garage is an allowable use, an
office building in excess of 35 feet is not allowed under
the existing zoning regulations. As the proposed
office/garage structure will exceed 35 feet, the developer
is in need of a new zoning ordinance from the City Council
in order to proceed. [13]
A number of City Councillors and neighborhood residents
do not support additional commercial development in Central
Square. They are, however, strongly in favor of residential
development. The strategy of the developer to date has been
to formulate an overall plan for the two parcels on the east
and west side of Prospect Street which acknowledges these
political realities. In presenting a "package deal" of both
the garage/office structure and housing project, the
developer recognizes the desire of the City Council and the
community for additional multifamily housing as well as
their opposition to additional commercial development. The
developer believes that the City Coucil will look more
favorably upon his request for a zoning amendment for the
garage/office structure if the housing project is contingent
upon its receipt.
32
RENT CONTROL
Since 1969, the rental housing stock in the city of
Cambridge has been governed by stringent rent control laws
which limit the initial rents, rental increases and return
on investment to owners of property constructed prior to
1969. Out of a total of 25,484 privately owned rental units,
15,000 units, or 58% units are under the jurisdiction of
rent control. [14]
With regard to the applicability of these laws to the
proposed project in Central Square, it is clear that the
statute exempts any new construction project built after
January 1,1969. The enabling legislation for the city is the
Cambridge Rent Control and Eviction Enabling Act, passed by
the Massachusetts Senate and House of Representatives on
March 31, 1976. The act defines "controlled rental units" as
all rental units except".. .2) rental units the construction
of which was completed on or after January 1,1969, or which
are housing units created by the conversion from housing to
nonhousing use on or after said date..."
Because the proposed project does not fall under the
jurisdiction of the Rent Control Board, the existing
ordinance which prohibits conversion of rental property into
condominiums does not apply. [15] In 1979, the City Council
passed an ordinance restricting the conversion of controlled
rental units into condominiums except in the case of the
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sale of a unit to a tenant who has lived in the unit
continuously since August 10,1979. Because the proposed
project does not contain "controlled units", the prohibition
against conversion does not apply.
Future Application of Rent Control Laws
While the existing law clearly exempts buildings
constructed after 1969, the City Council can always revise
the existing statute to move the exemption date into the
future. For instance, in 1990, the City Council could revise
the existing law to define controlled units as those
constructed on or after January 1, 1990. Under this
scenerio, the proposed project would fall under the
jurisdiction of the Rent Control Board. The future
application of rent control laws would have a very serious
impact on the project and the long term projections of
financial feasibility.
The likelihood of an expansion of the existing law is
contingent upon: (1) the position of those city coucil
memebers who are in favor of rent control and (2) the
overall political climate in the city. According to the
Staff Director of the Rent Control Board, Bob Mervis, the
city coucilmen, state legislatores and activists (such as
Legal Aid lawyers) who support rent control do not believe
that these laws should be extended to new construction
multi-family projects. Mr. Mervis maintains that even these
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advocates of rent control understand that its extension to
newly constructed projects will have a negative impact on
increasing the overall supply of rental housing through new
construction.
Mr. Mervis points to the legislative history
surrounding rent control to support his conclusions. In
brief, when Govenor Dukkais was initially elected in 1970,
he convinced the legislature to pass a statewide enabling
act, which allowed individual communities to enact their own
rent control laws. The cities of Boston, Cambridge,
Somerville and Brookline subsequently passed rent control
laws. In 1975, when the state enabling legislation expired,
Dukkais was unable to convince the state legislature to
pass an extension of the prior bill. As a result, the
present procedure requires the locality, such as Cambridge,
to seek approval from the state legislature and the Govenor
of any revised rent control statutes. Only after the
legislature has passed the bill and the Govenor has signed
it can the statute become law. Mr. Mervis argues that the
requirement of approval by the state legislature and the
govenor will serve as a "check" on the activities of the
City Council. Local realtors, however, point out that the
state legislature tends to respect the concept of home rule
and would, in all likelihood, approve any legislative
initiative presented by the City Council.
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The future political climate in the city will also
affect the probabilities of a revision of the statute. Even
though it is impossible to predict the climate, the city's
unique electoral system does provide a number of clues as to
how City Coucillors will evaluate the need for an expansion
of the existing laws.
A key feature of this system is that the power in
Cambridge lies with the City Council. The mayor is a
figurehead, as opposed to other municipalities such as
Boston where he (or she) leads the municipal government. The
mayor is elected from the city council by a majority of
votes, and therefore does not recieve the mandate from the
electorate that would be forthcoming as a result of a
general election.
The electoral system encourages the nomination and
election of Coucillors who are more attuned to the interests
of particular groups, as opposed to the concerns of the
larger majority. City coucilmen are elected under a system
of proportional, as opposed to majority, representation.
Voters prioritize their votes and candidates are elected on
the basis of a minimum number of "#1" votes. The net result
is that city coucilmen need to secure a minimum of the total
number of voters cast divided by the number of council seats
plus one. In the last election, a candidate needed only
3,112 votes out of 28,000 votes cast in the city to secure a
seat. This number represents only 3% of the city's overall
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population. [16]
The effect of proportional representation is to
encourage candidates who are responsive to the interests of
a small minority. Because these coucilmen do not have to
appeal to the majority of voters, they are not required to
confront a number of issues which have an overall impact on
the city. As a result, the ability of the city coucil or
public officals to create longer term strategies which
address these issues is severly hindered.
The only way to guarantee that the proposed project
does not fall under the jurisdiction of rent control is to
utilize state or federal financing. For instance, if the
developer financed the project under the state SHARP
program, the rents in the project would be regulated by the
Massachsetts Housing Finance Agency and the project would be
exempt from rent control, even if the City Council pushed
the exemption date into the future. [17]
CONCERNS OF NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENTS
Lastly, the political feasiblity of the housing project
is contingent upon the reaction of the residents immediately
adjacent to the site. The residents are formally organized
into an advisory coucil named the Neighborhood Four
Coalition, which has jurisdiction over Neighborhood Four,
bounded on the southern edge by Massachusetts Avenue.
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On the basis of discussions with the leaders of the
Neighborhood Four Coalition and city officals, it appears
that the concerns of the residents will focus on three
issues: 1) the impact of traffic generated by the project;
2) the overall design of the building and its compatablity
with adjacent structures and 3) the availability of a number
of the units to low-and moderate- income residents. [18] The
developer has initiated a series of meetings with
neighborhood residents and city officals to inform them of
the project and solicit their opinions . This process should
enable the developer and neighborhood residents to reach an
acceptable compromise over a majority of the design issues,
as well as an approach to mitigate against the impact of
additional traffic generated by the project.
With regard to the provision of rental units affordable
to low-and-moderate income persons, the developer must first
decide how the project will be financed, and whether such a
financial structure enables him to make these units
affordable to lower income persons and subsequently present
these conclusions to the community residents. While this
scenerio may appear obvious at first, the developer must
refrain from raising expectations without some assurance
that these expectations will be met. If it is not feasible
to provide units at rents affordable to low-and moderate-
income persons, the developer may need to demonstrate this
by sharing his proformas with key members of the community,
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as well as the City Coucil.
The strategy of the neighborhood residents with regard
to negotiations with the developer and the City Coucil
cannot be fully predicted at this time. The Winn
Developement Company has had the most recent experience of
interacting and negotiating with the residents of Central
Square. As was described in Chapter Two, the development
company is presently constructing a 85 unit residential
project at the intersection of River Street and Western
Avenue, located in Neighborhood Five. The project mananger
stated that the community group was an active member of the
development team and strongly negotiated for a number of
design changes, as well as the provision of 3000 square feet
of commercial space on the ground floor of the project. [19]
However, the project manager added that the neogotiations
were carried out in good faith and that the project received
their full support.
A major distinction between the Winn developement and
the project under consideration is that the developer was
able to secure sufficient public subsidies to finance those
project amenities desired by the neighborhood. The next
chapter will carefully analyze the financial feasibility of
the proposed 45 unit project, and whether the financial
structure can accomodate the desires of the neighborhood
residents.
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CHAPTER IV
FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY
During the last decade, the financial feasibility of
newly constructed rental housing projects in older cities
has become imperiled, as the cost of construction and
operating expenses has increased faster than rent levels.
Even in cities such as Cambridge where the demand for rental
housing is overwhelming, a rent level cannot always be
achieved which generates revenues sufficient to cover the
cost of operating expenses and debt service. The lack of
privately financed, newly constructed rental housing in the
city during the last fifteen years is evidence of the
difficulties in achieving financial feasibility.
The project under consideration is no exception to this
overall trend in the field of rental housing. However, the
project suffers from an additional handicap, specifically
its location in Central Square. As was discussed in Chapter
Two, the negative image of Central Square has the effect of
reducing the rents below those levels which could be
achieved in alternative locations such as Harvard Square.
According to local brokers, the rent levels of $650 for a
one bedroom and $800 for a two bedroom (exclusive of utility
payments) are the "top of the market" for a newly
constructed unit located on the site under consideration,
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one block from Central Square. These rent levels represent a
discount of approximately $200 per month as a result of the
poor image of Central Square.
The difficulties in achieving financial
feasibility for a rental housing project, when combined with
the additional handicap of this project's location, requires
the developer to think creatively about financing
strategies. If the project is not feasible using
conventional, long term financing, the developer must
consider options to reduce the cost of financing and/or the
project's overall costs. This chapter first analyzes: 1) the
impact of financing the project on a conventional basis and
2) the criteria used to measure financial feasibility. When
the project has been found to be infeasible on a
conventional basis, a range of private and public financing
alternatives are examined, and their impact on the
feasibility of the project is examined. In addition, several
alternatives to reduce the overall cost of the project are
analyzed concurrently. The challenge is to create a strategy
to reduce both the cost of financing and overall project
costs which can be implemented in the near future and well
as assure the economic success of the project.
THE BASE CASE
In order to evaluate the base case using conventional
financing, a template was developed to project revenues and
41
expenses over a ten year period, as well as the before and
after tax return. After consultation with the developer, the
following assumptions have been incorporated into the base
template.
Table 4: Project Cost and Revenue Assumptions
Project Costs
Land Costs
Building Costs
Parking Costs
Development Fee
Contingency
Revenues
One bedroom
(660 s.f.)
Two bedroom
(905 s.f.)
Vacancy Rate
$820
$1000
5%
$10,000 per unit
$64.00 per square foot
$5,000 per space
5% of total costs
5% of total costs
Operating Expenses
Management 5% of net
revenues
Maintenance 2% of net
revenues
Total $3,074
per unit
Construction Period: 20 months
Holding Period: Ten years
Disposition Cap Rate: 9%
Before Tax Discount Rate: 20%
After Tax Discount Rate : 10%
Growth Factors
Rents 5% per yr.
Expenses 4% per yr.
Because of the importance of rent levels to the
overall economic feasibility of the project, the methodology
used to establish them should be identified. The projected
rent levels for the one and two bedroom units were developed
by trending, at 6%, the rents which can be achievable at the
present time at the site forward until the first year of
operation. As was discussed in the previous chapter, rental
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brokers believe that the highest rents which could be
achieved at the present time for the proposed size and
quality of unit is $650 for a one bedroom and $800 for a two
bedroom, exclusive of utiliities and on site parking. The
developer anticipates that the project could be complete and
available for occupancy approximately September 1,1989. The
brokers interviewed believe that a rate of six precent is a
conservative estimate of the increase in the rents of
decontrolled units.
In addition, because the largest component of the
project cost is the building cost on a square foot basis,
the assumptions used to establish the cost per square foot
should be noted. The building construction costs were
developed on the basis of discussions with the developer,
who estimated present costs of $55 per square foot exclusive
of parking. This cost was trended upward six percent
annually for two and one half years until the commencement
of construction to arrive at a figure of $64 per square
foot.
CONVENTIONAL LONG TERM FINANCING
The base case for the project was developed using
financing provided on a conventional, non-participation,
long term basis. Conventional financing sources who would be
willing to finance this project are commercial banks and
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institutional lenders such as insurance companies or pension
funds. The case uses an interest rate of 12% and
amortization period of 30 years, on the basis of
discussions with a syndicator and investment banker familiar
with the cost of permanent financing at the present time.
[20] Because the developer is not interested in investing
equity into the project, the author analyzed the project as
if it would receive debt financing equal to the entire
project cost. In addition, the author assumed that
syndication proceeds would be used to finance operating
deficits in the initial years and that the project would be
syndicated for an amount equal to the operating deficits.
Under this alternative, the project is clearly not
feasible. It generates $1,412,383 in cash losses in the
first nine years of operation. As was stated above, the
author has assumed that the equity investment by limited
partners will equal the operating deficits. The limited
partners would therefore invest $1,412,383. The tax losses
generated during the pay-in period are $3,400,002. The ratio
of tax losses to operating deficits is equal to 2.4 to 1.
Because of the magnitude of these losses, the after tax net
present value, discounted at 10%, is equal to $479,894.
The tax losses generated under the base case are so
large that the project meets the criteria of equity
investors, who usually desire a ratio of $2 dollars of tax
losses to one dollar of cash invested during the pay-in
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period. [21] However, the real cash losses are so
substantial as to make the project impossible to finance
with potential investors.
In addition to generating unacceptably large cash
losses, the project fails to meet the underwriting criteria
of conventional lenders. When the first year net operating
income is capitalized at 9%, the projected value of
$3,742,811 is less than the total development costs of
$4,987,661.
Lastly, the project is a poor investment for the
developer if conventional financing is used. Its rate of
return on assets (8%) is well below the rates of between 12%
and 18% anticipated by a majority of developers.
CRITERIA TO MEASURE FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY
The base case using conventional financing demonstrates
the difficulty in generating revenues from a newly
constructed housing project which will finance debt service
and operating costs. If the project cannot work on a
conventional basis, the alternatives are to reduce either
the cost of capital or project costs, or both, in order to
bring the project within the range of economic feasibility.
At a minimum, these financial alternatives must reduce
the real cash losses from the project and, if these losses
do occur, confine them to no more than four years after the
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first year of operations. However, even if these
alternatives reduce the cash operating deficits, they must
also be compatible with the financial interests of the
developer in the project. The developer will earn a
significant return only well into the holding period, after
sufficient time has elapsed and rents have risen faster than
operating expenses and debt service on an annual basis. The
return to the developer will be forthcoming in the later
years of the project and as importantly, upon sale,
refinance or conversion into condominiums. Therefore, any
financial alternative should enable the developer to capture
this return in the later years. In addition, these financial
alternatives should enable the developer to keep his equity
investment to minimum, as he wishes to secure one hundred
percent debt financing. Lastly, the financial alternative
should be available in the marketplace at the present time
or in the near future, with a realistic possibility of
securing such financing.
PARTICIPATION LONG TERM FINANCING
In order to reduce the cost of capital to achieve
economic feasibility, the alternative of a participation
mortgage from a private lender was examined. Under this
alternative (Number 2), the participation mortgage has an
interest rate of 10% and the lender receives a 50 % share of
1) the cash flow after payment of operating expenses and
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debt service and 2) residuals upon sale or refinance. The
interest rate of 10% was chosen on the basis of discussions
with a syndicator and investment banker familiar with the
cost of participation mortgages for multi-family
housing.[22]
The impact of this alternative is that although the
cash losses are significantly reduced, the project is still
economically infeasible. The table below summarizes the
impact of on the project when the interest rate is reduced
by 200 basis points from 10% to 12%.
Table 5:Comparison of Conventional & Participation Financing
Alternative #1:Conventional #2:Participation
12% 10%
Cash Losses $1,412,383 $706,000
Percentage Change 50%
Period of Cash 9 years 6 years
Losses
Tax Losses during $3,400,002 $2,088,536
Pay-in period
Before Tax NPV negative negative
After Tax NPV $479,894 $567,843
Before Tax IRR negative negative
The most significant impact of utilizing a
participation mortgage is a 50% reduction in the operating
deficits. In addition, the period of operating losses drops
from nine to six years. However, while the overall financial
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"picture" improves under this alternative, the project
remains economically infeasible. In the first four years of
the project, the debt coverage ratio does not exceed .80.
The cash losses are so large that financing from a lender or
equity investor would not be forthcoming.
THE IMPACT OF REDUCING PROJECT COSTS
If a reduction in the cost of capital does not make the
project economically feasible, the developer can reduce the
project costs concurrently with securing a participation
mortgage at 10%. There are three components of the project
costs which can be reduced. First, the building costs can be
reduced from $64 per square foot to $58 per square foot,
which represents a reduction of approximately 10%. This
reduction can be accomplished without a significant drop in
the quality level of the units. A construction cost of $58
per square foot is equal to $50 per square foot in current
dollars.
The second cost component which can be reduced is the
developer's fee, which is equal to 5% of the overall project
cost in the base case. The developer can forego his fee and
thereby recieve no reimbursement upfront for his services.
Lastly, the land cost can be reduced from $10,000 per unit
to $5,000 per unit. The latter figure is consistent with the
current land prices for rental apartment units.
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If the project is financed with a participation
mortgage at 10% and the costs are reduced as discussed
above, the project becomes significantly more feasible. The
table below summarizes the impact of a reduction in project
costs.
Table 6: Comparison of Participation Loan at 10% with
and without Reduction in Project Costs
Alternative #2:Participation
10%
Cash Losses $706,000
Percentage Change 63%
Period of Cash Losses 6 years
Tax Losses during $2,088,529
pay-in period
Before Tax NPV negative
After Tax NPV $567,843
Before Tax IRR negative
#3:Participation
10% w/Costs Reduced
$259,315
4 years
$1,155,978
negative
$831,491
12.81%
The most significant impact of this alternative is a
reduction of 63% in the cash losses from $706,000 to
$259,315. In addition, the cash losses occur in the first
four years, as opposed to a six year period under the
previous alternative. The before tax IRR becomes positive
and the after tax NPV increases by thirty two percent.
ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF PRIVATE FINANCING
The
strategy
capital
analysis summarized above indicates that the
of reducing 1) project costs and 2) the cost of
through a participation mortgage is the most
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realistic alternative if the developer chooses to use
private financing. However, the developer will still face
significant obstacles if he wishes to secure a mortgage to
finance the entire project. The permanent lender may not
provide a long term loan in the face of substantial
operating deficits in the early years, even if the developer
is able to secure limited partners who agree, at the time of
permanent loan closing, to finance these deficits. In all
likelihood, the lender will insist on a debt coverage ratio
of 1.15 in the first year of operation and thereby reduce
the face value of the loan to achieve this ratio. The
developer can seek out a secondary lender to provide interim
financing during the early years of the project. [23] The
interim loan would be "taken out" by the permanent lender as
operating deficits decline. The secondary lender might
require collateral other than the subject project, in
addition to a personal guarantee from the developer. The
cumulative demands of the two lenders and the investors
could increase the transaction costs significantly, as well
as make the financing package complicated and therefore
difficult to close.
In addition to these obstacles, the alternative of a
participation loan requires the developer to assume all of
the risk for the first four years when the project is
generating cash losses, but share fifty percent of the
profit when the project finally "turns the corner". As a
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result, a participation loan does not meet a criterion of
the developer, specifically to capture a large portion of
the project's cash flow in later years.
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCING
The difficulties associated with securing private
financing for the proposed project require the developer to
analyze the alternatives available through the public
sector. These alternatives will increase the transaction
costs of the project, as well as impose a number of
restrictions. In exchange, the developer may be able to
secure operating subsidies and/or a reduction in the cost of
capital which will enable the project to become economically
feasible. The developer must determine whether these costs
and restrictions can be justified on the basis of the
subsidy that is forthcoming.
The balance of this chapter will describe in detail the
federal and state programs available to finance newly
constructed, multi-family rental housing. The costs,
benefits and restrictions of each program will be
identified. Subsequently, the economic feasibility of the
proposed project will be analyzed using these public
financing alternatives.
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FEDERAL FINANCING PROGRAMS
Since the commencement of the first Reagan
Administration in 1980, the number of programs available
from the federal government to finance low and moderate
income rental housing have greatly diminished. Considering
the long-standing history of the federal government in
financing moderate income housing, this reduction has
critically affected the ability of both the private and
public sectors to respond to the demand for rental housing.
The two subsidy programs available for the construction
of family rental housing are the Housing Action Grant
Program (HDAG) and the Urban Development Action Grant
Program (UDAG), both funded by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. The HDAG program was funded with an
initial appropriation of $315 million in Fiscal Year
1985.[24] As of this date, the Department has completed its
review of applications for funding, and expects to make its
second and final funding awards by August 1, 1985. The
Administration's budget for HUD calls for the termination of
the program in Fiscal Year 1986, and the Department does not
expect that Congress will offer an alternative to require
its continuation.
The only other source of financing is the Urban
Developement Action Grant program (UDAG), which provides
construction and permanent financing for real estate
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projects in urban areas. As of this date, Congress has
approved an annual authorization of $330 million for the
coming fiscal year, which represents a 25% reduction in the
program's FY 1985 budget.[25]
The competition for UDAG funds is fierce and, given
current guidelines, the possibility of securing funding for
the proposed project is negligible. Projects that are
funded have the following characteristics: 1) they are
located in cities that are defined by the Department as
"distressed"; 2) they generate a large number of new jobs
and tax revenues and 3) they leverage a minimum of five or
six dollars of private funding for every one dollar of UDAG
financing. While the city of Cambridge is defined as a
"distressed" city, its poverty rate and percentage of
substandard units is not as great as a number of other
cities. Therefore, the project would not be as competitive
as other projects from more "distressed" cities. In
adddition, because the project is residential as opposed to
commercial, it would not generate additional jobs for the
city. Finally, in order for the project to achieve a
positive cash flow in the first year of operations, the
ratio of private to UDAG dollars would be approximately
three to one. This ratio is significantly lower than the
ratio achieved by projects that recieve funding under the
program.[26]
Because these two programs represent the only federal
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initiatives to encourage the production of rental housing,
the developer must look to the state of Massachusetts for
public sector financing alternatives.
STATE FINANCING PROGRAMS
The state of Massachusetts has taken the lead in
creating new programs which attempt to fill the gap created
by the decline in federal funding. The Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency and the Executive Office of Communities and
Developement have developed programs to reduce the cost of
capital and/or provide annual operating subsidies for
munlti-family rental projects.
THE SHARP PROGRAM
The primary financing tool available at the present
time is a combination of tax-exempt financing in conjunction
with an annual project subsidy provided under the State
Housing Assistance for Rental Production Program (SHARP).
The purpose of the program is to encourage the production of
rental housing available to middle income persons who can
afford to pay market rate rents, as well as lower income
persons who recieve a rent subsidy.[27]
Program Benefits
Construction and permanent financing for SHARP-assisted
projects is provided through the Massachusetts Housing
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Financing Agency (MHFA) from the sale proceeds of tax-exempt
bonds. The interest on these bonds is approximately 2 to 4
points below conventional financing. At the present time,
the interest rtae on bonds issued by MHFA is approximately
9.5% to 10%.
In addition to the favorable financing provided through
the use of tax-exempt financing, the Executive Office of
Communities and Development (EOCD) provides SHARP funds to
finance operating deficits. These funds are in the form of a
loan to write down the cost of interest payments on the tax-
exempt bonds. By statue, the SHARP program may only provide
"the minimum amount necessary to make the proposed rental
housing project feasible...". This amount is defined as the
gap between the "cost-based" rent and the "attainable" rent.
"Cost-based" rent is defined as the rent necessary to
support debt service payments and operating costs of a
project. "Attainable rent" is defined as the maximum rent
which can be achieved in the market. Because "attainable"
rents will grow more quickly than "cost based" rents, the
amount of the subsidy should decline after the initial years
of operation and the project must be self-sufficient by its
15th year. (Because the SHARP program is administered by a
public agency, the author questions whether MHFA is willing
to underwrite projects with rents which "push" the top of
the market upward and result in a substantial lease up
period. The agency may favor projects which have "average"
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or "conservative" rents and are fully rented upon
completion, as opposed to those projects which achieve
higher rental income streams and require less subsidy over
the long term but have a longer and more difficult lease-up
period.)
The Executive Office of Communities and Development
(EOCD) requires that the developer make a minimum equity
investment of 20% in order to make the required statutory
finding that the SHARP subsidy is the minimum amount
reqiured for project feasibility. In essence, once the
developer has agreed to invest 20% of the project cost as
equity (as defined below), the SHARP program provides an
annual subsidy to the project. The subsidy reduces the
interest payments on the bond issue from the rate prevailing
at the time of bond issuance for tax-exempt rental housing
projects to no lower than 5% annually. The term of the
subsidy cannot exceed fifteen years.
Because the SHARP subsidy is a loan, it must be repaid
"as the project can afford to do so" but in no event later
than upon sale or refinance. At the time of repayment, the
developer will repay the lesser of the outstanding SHARP
loan or 50% of the sale proceeds. The regulations state
that if the repayment does not equal the entire SHARP
subsidy, "the unpaid remainder will be scheduled for later
payment." During the term of the loan, interest accrues at
5% annually, although EOCD and MHFA may reduce the interest
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rate on the unpaid remainder of the loan at the end of the
subsidy term, if such a reduction protects low-income
residents. In addition, the program allows for the
recycling of SHARP funds back into the project as opposed to
a loan repayment, if it can be demonstrated that these
recycled funds will benefit the low and moderate income
tenants. In any event, the developer must demonstrate how
the low interest tenants will be "protected" after the SHARP
subsidy end.
Program Restrictions
In return for reducing the cost of capital and
providing an annual operating subsidy, the program places
major restrictions on the developer. These restrictions fall
into two general categories: 1) a setaside of the units for
low and moderate income persons and 2) a minimum equity
investment and a limitation on the annual return to the
developer.
The program requires that a minimum of 25% of the units
must be affordable to low-income persons, who are defined as
families with incomes which do not exceed 80% of the area's
median income. The rents in these units are set according
to the maximum limit allowed under HUD's Section 8 Existing
program, which provides rental assistance payments to low
income persons. Developers must market these units to
persons who have already secured certificates for rental
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payments under HUD's Section 8 program or the state's
Section 707 Program (similar in structure and purpose to the
Section 8 Program). If the developer is unable to fill all
of the units with persons who have certificates, the state
will additional make Section 707 certificates available to
subsidize the rents of those units set aside for low income
tenants. The developer is required to fill the units with
tenants chosen from the waiting list compiled by the local
Housing Authority. In summary, the developer relinquishes a
certain amount of control over the tenant selection process
for these units in exchange for favorable financing provided
under the program. The program also requires the developer
to maintain these units as affordable to low income persons
for a minimum of fifteen years.
The second program restriction requires a significant
equity investment from the developer and also regulates the
cash return received by the developer on an annual basis.
The equity investment is equal to 20% of the project costs,
and is composed of the following components:
1) The developer's fee of 10% of project costs
(exclusive of land costs). If the developer chooses to
forego his fee, the equity required at closing can be
proportionately reduced.
2) Cash equal to 2% of the mortgage amount.
3) A standard letter of credit in a minimum amount
equal to 4% of the mortgage for the term of their mortgage.
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This letter of credit can decline by 1% per year after each
year with a positive cash flow.
4) An additional letter of credit for a term of five
years in the amount of 4% of the mortgage. The developer
may reduce this letter of credit by an amount equal to cash
contribution at closing in excess of 2% or the present value
of any operating subsidy that the developer proposes to
provide.
The program also limits the annual return on equity to
a maximum of 6% for fifteen years. However, the program does
provide reasonable allowances for management fees (6% of
gross rents), replacement reserve (.075% of the direct
construction costs) and a vacancy allowance (a minimum of
5%). These allowances can provide the developer with an
additional source of income.
Availability of Sharp Funds
The competiton for SHARP funds is keen, given the lack
of alternative financing sources from the federal
government. Since July 1, 1984, a total of $13 million as
been allocated by the State legislature and expended by the
Executive Office of Communities and Development. The demand
for SHARP funds, as measured by formal applications, has
exceeded the appropriations by over 600%. It is anticipated
that additional SHARP funds will not be available untill
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spring of 1986, at which time EOCD will fund applications
from appropriations to be recieved from the state on July
1,1986.
In addition, two projects located in Cambridge have
been funded under the SHARP program during the last year.
Given the political necessity of ensuring that SHARP funds
are provided to a variety of communities across the state,
additional projects from the city of Cambridge may be less
competitive than those from communities which have not
secured program funding to date.
THE TELLER PROGRAM
The second alternative available on a state level is a
new program call the TELLER Program. Under the program,
local Housing Authorities can issue tax-exempt bonds to
finance rental housing projects. The program requires that
20% of the units be affordable to moderate income
persons.[28]
Program Benefits
The major advantage of the TELLER program is that a
developer can access long term financing at low rates, and,
in the case of a high income area such as Cambridge, provide
a relatively shallow subsidy in return. Under the program, a
total of 20% units must be set aside for persons with
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incomes that do not exceed 80% of the median income of the
municipality. In the case of the city of Cambridge, eighty
percent of the median income is equal to $25,850. Given the
requirement that no more than 30% of the family's income can
be used to pay for the cost of shelter, the maximum rent for
a rental unit, inclusive of utilities, is equal to $646. If
the rents for the market rate units are fixed at $820 for a
one bedroom and $1000 for a two bedroom (exclusive of
utilities), the annual project subsidy to make units
affordable to moderate income persons is $30,720.
At the present time, the interest rate on tax-exempt
bonds for multi-family rental housing projects ranges from
8.0% to 10.%, inclusive of transaction costs. If a developer
wishes to secure tax-exempt financing on a longer term basis
such as ten or twelve years, the interest rate on the bonds
will be in the range of 9% to 10.5%. Depending upon the
method used to issue the bonds, the developer will pay
between six and ten points initially to finance transaction
costs.[29]
The major barrier to the developer who wishes to enter
the capital market for tax-exempt bonds is the requirement
to secure "credit enhancement". Bondholders require some
form of "credit enhancement" from the developer in order to
ensure that funds will be available to pay principal and
interest payments should the project generate insufficient
cash flow. Credit enhancement is secured through four
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sources: 1) an insurance company, who issues a guarantee or
surety bond; 2) the Department of Housing and Urban
Developement (HUD), who provides insurance through the
221(d)(4) program; 3) rated letters of credit, which are
secured through a rated, commerical bank or unrated letters
of credit secured through a savings and loan institution;
and 4) insurance provided through the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FANNIE MAE).[30]
The project under consideration herein would, in all
likelihood, be unattractive to an insurance company on the
basis of its' size as a $5 million project.[31] With regard
to the second option of securing mortgage insurance through
HUD, the primary drawback is the amount of time involved in
securing approval under the 221 (d) (4) program. The average
timeframe to secure a firm committment is approximately one
year.[32] The Department charges an anuual insurance
premium of one half of one point for insurance. Given a base
rate of 8.25% for these bonds, the effective rate under this
option would be 8.75%.
If the third option is analyzed, the feasibility of
securing a letter of credit from a rated commercial bank has
diminished recently as bank regulators have become
increasingly critical of contigent liabilities such as
letters of credit. In addition, in a volatile capital
market, banks are unwilling to provide long term letters of
credit which would be coterminous with the tax-exempt issue.
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Although some Savings and Loan Associations may be willing
to issue letters of credit, they are unrated in the
marketplace. In order to ensure that bonds backed up with a
letter of credit from an S & L receive a favorable rating in
the marketplace, these institutions must collateralize the
letter of credit with assets having a value equal to between
120% and 170% of the face value of the bonds. In addition,
the annual fee to secure a letter of credit will add 1.25%
to the interest rate, yielding an effective rate of 9.5% for
these bonds at the present time.[33]
Lastly, the Federal National Mortgage Association does
provide insurance for multi-family tax-exempt issues.
Unfortunately, their underwriting criteria of a debt
coverage ratio of 1.15 at the end of the second year of
occupancy makes this project, as well as almost all of the
potential projects in the Northeast, unacceptable.[34]
In summary, all of the four credit enhancement
alternatives discussed above present problems for the
developer. However, the most feasible alternative appears to
be to secure mortgage insurance through the 221(d)(4)
program, although this option would require a significant
amount of time and energy to "lead" the project through the
program's procedures. In addition, HUD will require letters
of credit from the developer in order to finance operating
losses generated in the early years. Provision of mortgage
insurance for the project will be contingent upon the
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developer's ability to secure these letters of credit.
In addition to reducing the cost of capital to the
developer, the TELLER program allows the developer to retain
control over the tenant selection process. The
responsibility to comply with the minimum set aside of 20%
of the units rests with the developer and the bond
purchaser, as opposed to the local Housing Authority. The
remaining 80% of the units can be rented at prevailing
market rates.
Program Restrictions
The program contains few restrictions in comparison to
the SHARP program. As was stated above, the developer must
make 20% of the units affordable to low income persons. In
addition, these units must remain affordable during what is
termed the "lock-in" period. The "lock-in" period is
defined as the period beginning on the date of issuance of
the bonds and ending on the later of the date 1) which is
ten years after 50% of the units are occupied or 2) half
of the term of the bond with the longest maturity in the
bond issue.
The developer is also prohibited from converting the
project into a condominimum during the lock-in period,
although this restriction may be less onerous if the term of
the bonds is relatively short. In addition, for a period
equal to four years after the expiration of the lock-in
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period, if the developer wishes to convert the project into
condominium units, he may do so only if the low and moderate
income tenants can remain in the project on a rental basis
until the end of this additional four year period. After
the four years has passed, there are no restrictions on the
developer with regard to conversion or requirement to enable
low and moderate income tenants to continue occupancy in the
project.
The most significant difference between the SHARP and
TELLER programs is that the TELLER program does not restrict
the annaul return to the developer during the bond term or
thereafter. Because this project generates a significant
cash flow in the later years, ths distinction has an
important impact on measuring economic feasibility and
return.
Availability of TELLER bonds
Regulations for the TELLER program have been
promulgated only recently by the Executive Office of
Communities and Development. As such, the program does not
have an extensive track record in the state. The first bond
issued under the program was recently completed by the
Springfield Housing Authority, and applications for a total
of 3000 units are pending with other local housing
authorities. In addition, the Executive Office of
Communities and Development is gearing up to provide
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technical assistance to local housing authorities.
The only limitation on the availability of TELLER bonds
is the tax proposal recently submitted by the Reagan
Administration, which eliminates tax-exempt financing for
all newly constructed, rental housing projects. If the
Administration's bill is approved with this provision, the
only remaining federal initiative to reduce the cost of
capital for rental housing will disappear.
MHFA TAX-EXEMPT FINANCING
The final alternative available from the state of
Massachusetts is to access tax-exempt financing through the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) without a SHARP
subsidy. The rate on long term tax-exempt bonds issued by
MHFA is in the range of 9.5% to 10%.[34] To date, the agency
has issued tax-exempt bonds for rental housing projects only
when a SHARP subsidy is also available. However, the agency
anticipates that legislation pending presently in the
statehouse will enable it to issue tax-exempt bonds without
a SHARP subsidy in the near future.
Program Benefits
The basic features of the program sponsored by MHFA are
similar to the TELLER program. The benefit of securing tax-
exempt financing through MHFA is that, as a coinsurer, they
can perform the underwriting analysis required to receive
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insurance under the 221(d)(4) program more expeditiously
than the Federal Housing Administration. The time period
necessary to process an application can be reduced
significantly. In addition, the developer has to pay
approximately two points upfront to the Agency, as compared
to between six and ten points under the TELLER program.
Program Restriction
The MHFA program will incorporate many of the
restrictions of the TELLER program, such as the prohibition
against conversion until the end of the lock-in period.
However, the Agency plans to impose additional restrictions
which makes this option less economically feasible from the
perspective of the developer. These restrictions are: 1) the
developer will be required to invest equity into the project
equal to 10% of the overall cost, excluding the cost of land
acquisition or alternatively, or forego this amount as a
developer's fee; 2) the annual return received by the
developer will be limited to 6% of his equity investment for
fifteen years and 3) the developer will be restricted from
selling the bonds until the end of the fifteenth year. The
most serious of these three restrictions is the limitation
on return on equity to 6%. As a result, the before tax NPV
and IRR will be significantly less than with bonds issued
through the TELLER program.
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FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY OF PROJECT WITH PUBLIC FINANCING
This chapter will conclude with an analysis of the
financial feasibility of the proposed project, utilizing
SHARP, TELLER and MHFA financing. The financial risks and
return to the developer will be identified, as well as
compared to the benefits forthcoming if private financing is
utilized.
Project Feasibility with SHARP Financing
If a combination of SHARP funds and tax-exempt
financing is utilized, the project becomes economically
feasible. The table below compares the cash losses and
returns generated using: 1) SHARP subsidies and tax-exempt
bonds with an interest rate of 10% and 2) a participation
loan at 10% with a reduction in project costs (discussed
earlier in the chapter as Alternative #3).
Table 7:Comparison of SHARP and Participation Financing
Alternative #4: SHARP w/ #3: Participation
bonds at 10% 10% w/costs reduced
Cash Losses $20,384 $259,315
Percentage Change 92%
Period of Cash Losses 1 year 4 years
Tax Losses During
First Four Years $1,343,672 $1,155,978
Before Tax NPV $68,279 ($55,339)
After tax NPV $1,103,168 $831,491
Before Tax IRR 29.83% 12.81%
68
The overall financial picture changes dramatically when
SHARP financing is used. The risks to the developer are
largely eliminated, as the operating deficits drop from
$259,315 to $20,384. While the SHARP program requires the
developer to make an equity investment of $507,814, if the
developer agrees to forego his fee of $422,313, his cash
equity drops to $85,501.
Although the developer's return is limited to 6% for
the entire holding period, this limitation does not
negatively affect the net present value or rate of return of
the project. While the developer must repay $1,449,757 in
SHARP funds upon sale, the after tax NPV rises to $1,103,168
under this scenerio. The before tax rate of return of 29.83%
exceeds the developer's expectations of 20%.
The greatest benefit of using SHARP financing is the
elimination of those complications associated with securing
a participation loan, as discussed earlier in the chapter.
The developer is not required to syndicate the project in
order to achieve financial feasibility, or secure interim
financing from a secondary lender. However, as SHARP funds
are awarded on a competitive basis, the developer must be
willing to compete with other projects in the state of
Massachusetts.
Project Feasibility with TELLER Bonds
Unfortunately, the project is not economically feasible
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if TELLER bonds with an interest rate of 9% is used. As was
discussed above, credit enhancement will be difficult to
secure, although the most feasible option for the developer
is to secure mortgage insurance through HUD's 221(d)(4)
program. If this alternative was utilized, the effective
rate for the tax-exempt bonds would be approximately 9%.
Table 8: Comparison of SHARP and TELLER Financing
Alternative #4:SHARP w/ #5:TELLER bonds
bonds at 10% at 9%
Cash Losses $20,384 $761,670
Period of Cash Losses 1 year 7 years
Tax Losses During $671,839 $1,991,757
pay-in period during 1st 4 yrs. during 1st 7 yrs.
Before Tax NPV $68,279 ($140,219)
After Tax NPV $1,103,168 $786,716
Before Tax IRR 29.83% 13.04%
Similar to the private sector alternatives discussed
earlier, the losses generated with the use of TELLER bonds
at 9% are so large as to make the project impossible to
finance. The losses continue for seven years, which
constitutes a majority of the holding period. The magnitude
of these losses is a direct result of the annual subsidy of
$30,720, necessary to make the units affordable to lower
income tenants. This subsidy paid by the developer offsets
the reduced interest rate on the tax-exempt bonds. In
addition, the added cost of credit enhancement in the form
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of an annual insurance premium of 50 basis points increases
the effective rate on the bonds.
The only other type of option available to the
developer is to simultaneously reduce the costs of the
project and the interest rate on the tax-exempt bonds. As
was outlined earlier, project costs can be reduced if the
developer chooses to: 1) forego his development fee of 5%;
2) reduce building costs from $64 per square foot to $58 per
square foot and 3) reduce his land cost per unit from
$10,000 to $5,000.
In addition, the interest rate on the tax-exempt bonds
could be lowered to approximately 8%, if the developer was
able to secure credit enhancement from a joint venture
partner as opposed to financing this fee on an annual
basis. For instance, if the developer was able to interest
either Harvard University or MIT in the project as a source
of student housing, these institutions might be able to lend
their credit rating to the project and guarantee repayment
of the bonds to the bondholders. In this event, the
additional cost of credit enhancement would be eliminated
and the bonds would carry a rate of 8%.
The table below summarizes the financial feasibility of
the project when project costs and the interest rate on the
TELLER bonds are simultaneously reduced. In addition, this
alternative is compared Alternative #5, which utilizes
TELLER bonds at an interest rate of 9%.
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Table 9: Comparison of TELLER Bonds at 9% and TELLER Bonds
at 8% with a Reduction in Project Costs
Alternative
Cash Losses
Precentage Chang
Period of Losses
Tax Losses during
Pay-in Period
Before Tax NPV
After Tax NPV
Before Tax IRR
#5: TELLER bonds
at 9%
$761,670
77%
7 years
$1,991,757
($140,219)
$786,716
13.04%
#6: TELLER bonds at
8% w/costs reduced
$173,011
4 years
$882,658
$338,192
$1,255,234
44.55%
The project feasibility improves dramatically under
this last alternative. Cash losses are reduced by 77%, and
the before tax NPV becomes positive. The before tax rate of
return of 44.55% is the highest to date.
The project is clearly financially feasible under this
alternative, and is second only to the SHARP scenerio in
terms of reducing cash operating losses. The major
difficulty for the developer is to secure a joint venture
partner, such as MIT or Harvard University, who would be
willing to guarantee repayment of the bonds. These
institutions may not percieve that their interest in
creating additional student housing extends to providing
this guarantee.
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Project Feasibility with MHFA Financing
The rate for tax-exempt bonds issued by MHFA is
presently in the range of 9.5%, or 50 basis points higher
than the rate for TELLER bonds that are insured through
HUD's 221(d)(4) program. As was analyzed above, the project
is economically infeasible when TELLER bonds at 9% are used
(Alternative #5). Therefore, the project cannot be
economically feasible under MHFA's program, which provides
financing at a higher cost.
CONCLUSION
While the economic feasibility of the project was
doubtful using a participation loan from the private sector,
the project is feasible if public sector financing is used.
The SHARP program and the TELLER program (with an interest
rate of 8%) will minmize operating losses and provide a
healthy return to the developer. However, these options
carry the additional risk to the developer that, after
several months of negotiations with public and/or not-for-
profit institutions, the financing will not be forthcoming.
In the next chapter, the author will discuss the tradeoff
between the risks and rewards under these two options, as
well as present recommendations for action to the developer.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The previous chapters have described a number of
obstacles which confront a developer who wishes to build
multi-family housing. Because the costs of construction and
financing have risen faster than income and rent levels,
many rental housing projects have been pushed out of the
conventional financing market. They have proceeded only when
the developer has utilized an array of federal and state
initiatives, created to fulfill the public goal of making
rental housing available to middle and low income persons.
The proposed 45 unit rental housing project in Central
Square is no exception to this overall trend. The obstacles
to achieving market, political and financial feasibility are
significant, and the developer will be required to make a
large investment of time and energy if these obstacles are
to be overcome.
As has been discussed earlier, the political
feasibility of the project may be more attainable than
financial feasibility. Given the existing political climate
of the city, the developer may need to allocate a
significant amount of time to negotiations with appropiate
neighborhood organizations. However, city officals and
neighborhood activists are supportive of residential
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development. As a result, the author has concluded that the
probability is high that public approval and support for the
project will be forthcoming.
With regard to the market feasibility of the project,
the author believes that a desirable segment of the middle
income housing market can be attracted to the site. As was
discussed in Chapter Two, the growing demand for rental
housing in Cambridge helps to mitigate against the negative
image of the site and Central Square. However, the developer
must discount the rents by approximately $200 per month in
order to effectively compete with alternatives available in
the more desirable sections of the city. In summary, while a
desirable market for the project can be attracted given rent
levels of $820 for a one bedroom and $1000 for a two bedroom
at the time of lease-up, the revenue stream generated by
these discounted rent levels make the project more difficult
to finance.
The author sought to analyze the key issue of financial
feasibility using a variety of public and private
alternatives. These alternatives can be laid out along a
continuim that identifies the cost of operating and/or
capital subsidies and the corresponding level of public
intervention in the project. The most traditional financing
source, a conventional mortgage, provides the least economic
return to the developer. However, under this alternative,
the developer can pursue his objective of receiving one
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hundred percent of the cash flow and residuals upon sale or
refinance.
On the opposite extreme, the SHARP program provides an
annual operating subsidy to the project, and thereby fills
the gap between net operating income and debt service in
the early years of the project. In exchange, the developer
must agree to provide twenty five percent of the units to
lower income persons, and his rate of return on the project
is regulated for fifteen years. As significantly, the
developer must compete with other projects for a limited
amount of funding, and the project has no guarantee of
receiving the amount of SHARP funds requested.
The TELLER program falls within these two extremes.
The level of subsidy is not as deep as under the SHARP
program, and there are no limitations on the developer's
annual return. However, in order for the project to acheive
financial feasibility, the developer must be willing to
forego a development fee of 5%, as well as reduce the land
costs from $10,000 per unit to $5,000 per unit. In sum, the
developer is making a significant equity contribution. The
developer's criterion to minimize his equity investment is
not met.
In addition, if TELLER bonds are used, the developer
must identify a partner who can supply the necessary "credit
enhancement" and thereby reduce the rate on the tax-exempt
bonds. As was outlined earlier, the developer could attempt
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to interest Harvard or MIT as a joint venture partner to
provide the credit enhancement. However, the negotiations
with either of these institutions may be protracted and
require a substantial committment on the part of the
developer.
The author has concluded that the only alternatives
which can ensure financially feasiblity are the SHARP
program and the TELLER program with an interest rate of 8%
and reduced project costs. If the developer is unwilling to:
1) forego his fee and accept a lower land cost on a per unit
basis or 2) invest substantial time in competing for SHARP
funds, the project is not feasible and should not be
pursued. If these alternatives are acceptable, the
complications and contingencies associated with TELLER and
SHARP financing should be furthur explored. Specifically,
discussions should be initaited with the both MHFA and EOCD
to determine whether the project has a reasonable chance of
recieving SHARP financing in the spring of 1986. In
addition, the developer should initiate discussions with MIT
to determine whether the University is interested in the
project as a source of student housing and if their interest
extends to the provision of credit enhancement.
The present owner of the site does not have track
record in financing and constructing multifamily housing
projects. Therefore, if he does proceed, he will be required
to invest substantial time and energy in learning the
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intricacies of public programs, such as SHARP or TELLER. In
addition, he will have to learn how public agencies interact
and negotiate with the private sector. Unless he is
interested in developing additional housing projects in the
future, the "learning curve" may be too expensive and
timely, given his ability to pursue additional development
opportunities.
However, the developer has recognized the community's
desire for new rental housing, and the benefit of the
project in negotiations with the City Council for a zoning
amendment for the adjacent parcel. The developer may desire
to perserve this link between residential and commercial
development, but be unwilling to invest in the steep
"learning curve" associated with the project. His option is
to enter into a joint venture or sell the site to a housing
developer who has the necessary expertise.
Many of these housing developers are willing to bear
both the risks of a housing project that generates operating
losses in the early years, as well as the transaction costs
associated with a complicated financial package. In many
instances, these developers do not expect that their return
on investment will be generated by the project's cash flow.
Future syndication and sales proceeds for the project
provide them with their equity return. In addition, these
developers are familiar with the "language" of public
finance programs, as well as the negotiating style of public
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off icals.
The site has significant value to these developers. It
is located in a market with a limited supply of rental
housing and a demand that will not decline in the
foreseeable future. While the project is not economically
feasible in the initial phase, it generates large cash flows
in the later years. If the revitalization of Central Square
proceeds, the developer could convert the rental units into
condominiums in the later years and earn a significant
return.
The present owner should consider these options
carefully. The City Council may be unwilling to provide a
zoning amendment for the adjacent parcel without some
guarantee that a housing project will be developed on the
subject site. In this event, the owner may not be able to
sell the site to a housing developer without a firm
committment that he will construct a multifamily housing
project. The second option of a joint venture may require an
excessive amount of the owner's time (and legal fees) to
negotiate a joint venture agreement, given the relatively
small size of the project.
The final alternative available to the developer is to
maintain the site in its present condition as a parking lot.
The developer may conclude that the costs of development,
joint venture or sale are prohibitive at the present time.
If he chooses this option, he can proceed at a later date
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when the image of Central Square has improved and the
project can compete more favorably with alternative
locations in the city of Cambridge.
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EXHIBIT THREE
LIST OF COMPARABLES
NAME,LOCATION AND AGE NO.OF UNITS/ELEVATOR MONTHLY RENT/ SQ. FEET
1.Austin Court 6 stories
12 Inman Street 30 units
Cambridge,Ma.
(2 blocks from Central Sq.)
12 years old
2. 16-18 Trowbridge St.
Cambridge, Ma.
(Located NW within one
block of Mass. Ave)
Constructed in the 1970's
stories
28 units
3. The Cambridge House 7 st
1643 Cambridge Street 36 u
Cambridge, Ma.
(located near Harvard Square)
Constructed in 1970
Studios: $400-$500
One Bed.: S500-$600
Two Bed.: $750-$900
Studios: $400-$435
One Bed.: $595-$625
Two Bed.: $800-$850
One Bed.: $650
Two Bed.:$800-$950
Two Bed.: $950
1000 s.f./$0.95 s.f.
ory
nits
4.1600 Massachussetts Ave 5 stories
Cambridge, Ma. 60 units
5 years old
Twenty two covered parking spaces which rent for
$25 per month. A deck and sauna are located on
the roof. Gas heat is included in the rent.
Converted to condominium; roughly one third of
the units are currently rented.
Twenty eight parking spaces under the deck area
for $25 per month. Gas heat in included in the
rent.
Covered parking is included in the rents.Tenant
pays for oil fired baseboard hot water and heat.
Converted to condominiums in 1981; a number of
the units are currently rented.
Tenant pays for all utilities. Units include two
bathrooms. All units contain balconies and
fireplaces. Building is located adjacent
to Harvard Law school.
AMENITIES
5. Soldiers Field Park
Soldiers Field Road
Boston, Ma.
6. Peapody Terrace
Memorial Drive
Cambridge, Ma.
7. 115 Highland Street
Somerville, Ma.
3 years old
8. 425 Broadway
Somerville, Ma.
10 years old
9. 14 Spring Street
Somerville, Ma.
App. one year old
10. 278 Beacon Street
Somerville, Ma.
App. 7 years old
70 studios
186 One Bed.
198 Two Bed.
26 Three Bed.
89 Studios
226 One Bed.
161 Two Bed.
22 Three Bed.
3 stories
14 units
6 stories
24 units
4 stories
6 units
6 stories
36 units
Studio:$465-$552
One Bed.:$620-$759
Two Bed.: $820-$1090
Three Bed.: $1226-$1273
Studios: $366-399
One Bed.: $470-571
Two Bed.: $630-$744
Three Bed.: $1017
7 Two Bed.: $700
900 s.f./$0.78 psf
7 Three Bed.: $800
1000 s.f./$.80 psf
12 One Bed.: $600
650 s.f./$0.92 p.s.f.
12 Two Bed.: $730
900 s.f./$0.81 psf
6 Two Bed.: $750
875-900 s.f./$.83 psf
19 One Bed.:$600
650 s.f./$0.92 psf
17 Two Bed.: $700
900 s.f./$0.78 psf
Rent includes heat and hot water. Children's
center and play area available. Garage parking
available for $60 per month; uncovered parking
available for $45 per month. Harvard owned
and affiliated.
Heat and hot water are included in the rent.
The complex also includes a convenience store
and children's center. Garage parking available
for $60 per month. Harvard owned and
affiliated.
Heat, hot water, A/C, laundry, wall-to-wall carpeting
and one parking space are included in the monthly rent.
Heat, hot water, A/C, balconies, views and one
parking space included in the monthly rent.
Heat, hot water,A/C, wall to wall carpeting,laundry
facilities and one parking space included in the rent.
Heat, hot water, A/C, laundry facilities, wall
to wall carpeting and one parking space are
included in the monthle rent.
EXHIBIT IV: BASE CASE / FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY WITH CONVENTIONAL FINANCING
ALTERNATIVE #1
DEVELOPMENT PROFORMA: TOFIAS PROJECT
EXHIBIT A: GENERAL INFORMATION
DATE OF PROJECTION: August 1,1985
PROJECT NAME: CSR
LOCATION: Cambridge, Ma.
NUMBER OF UNITS: 45
EST. START DATE: 4/1/1988
COMPLETION DATE: 1/1/1990
CONSTRUCTION TIME: 20 months
A. SITE INFORMATION
Sqaure Footage of Parcel:
Bld. Gross Sqaure Footage:
Bid. Net Square Footage:
Building Efficiency:
No. of Parking Spaces:
27,376
47,400
38,520
81%
45
B. UNIT CHARACTERISTICS
Number of Units:
Total Sq. Feet:
No. of Studios:
Sq. Ft. per unit:
No. of (1) bedrm.
Sq. Ft. per unit:
No. of (2) bedrm.:
Sq. ft. per unit:
No. of (3) bedrm.:
Sq. Ft. per unit:
BASIS FOR PROJECTIONS
DEVELOPMENT PHASE
Land
Site Improvements
Building Construction
Parking
Consultants
Architectural & Engineering
Architectural Supervision
Development Fee
Legal and Accounting
Appraisal Fees
Permits
Marketing/Leasing
Insurance during Const.
R.E. Taxes during Const.
Contingency
Construction Loan Fee
Organizational Costs
$10,000.00
$0.00
$50,000.00
$64.00
$5,000.00
per
per
per
per
per
unit
unit
uni t
sq. feet
uni t
$10,000
3.75% of const. cost
1.25% of const. cost
5.00% of const cost
$60,000
$0
$0
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$217,290 5% of total costs
$0
$0
OPERATIONS PHASE
MONTHLY REVENUES
Studio:
(1) bedroom:
(2) Bedroom:
(3) bedroom:
Parking Spaces:
TOTAL ANNUAL REVENUES:
ANNUAL EXPENSES
Administrative
Management:
Maintenance:
Real Estate Taxes:
Utilities:
(Comon Area)
Utilities:
(Units)
Security:
$0
$820
$1,000
$0
$50
$547,560
$5,000
$27,378
$10,951
$50,000
$10,000
$0
$30,000
per
per
per
per
per
unit
unit
unit
unit
space
5.00% of revenues
2.00% of revenues
$0.00 per unit
p. 85
45
47,400
0
0
9
0
36
0
0
0
Working Capital (Operating Deficits)
Letters of Credit Fees
Commissions
SALE:
Stabilized Cap Rate:
Disposition Cap Rate:
Sales Expense:
TAXATION:
Ordinary Income:
Capital Gains:
STABILIZED YEAR:
HOLDING PERIOD:
(years)
GENERAL PARTNER RATE OF RETURN
Before Tax:
After Tax:
LIMITED PARTNER RATE OF RETURN
Before Tax:
After Tax:
$0
$0
$50,000
Water:
TOTAL EXPENSES:
Replacement Res.
LEASING
Vacancy Rate:
(Annual)
Revenues: Lease-Up
Year
Reveues:Stabilized
Year
11.0%
9.0%
6.0%
$5,000
$138,329 $3,073.98 per unit
$45,000
5% of gross revenues
100.00% of gross revenues
100.00% of gross revenues
50%
20%
2
10
GROWTH FACTORS:
Market Rents
Operating Expenses
DISTRIBUTION TO LIMITED PARTNERS
Percent of Cash Flow:
Percent of Tax Benefits:
Percent of Residuals:
20%
10%
25%
12%
6% per annum
4% per annum
50%
50%
50%
End of YearCONVENTION:
EXHIBIT B: PROJECT COST ESTIMATE
YEAR
ITEM COST ESTIMATE
Land
Improvements
Building
Parking
Site Improvements
Arch. & Eng.
Architectural Supervision
Total Improvements
Consultants
Legal and Accounting
Appraisal Fees
Permits
Marketing/Leasing
Insurance during Const.
R.E. Taxes during Const.
Contingency
Construction Loan Fee
Development Fee
Organizational Costs
Working Capital (Operating Deficits)
Commissions
Points
Construction Interest
Letters of Credit
Total Indirect Costs
YR. 1
CONSTRUCTION
YR. 2
LEASING
COST PER SQUARE FOOT
$450,000
$3,033,600
$225,000$0
$122,198
$40,733
$3,871,530
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$10,000
$60,000
$0
$0
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$217,290
$0
$162,930$0
$0
$50,000
$41,332
$434,579
$0
$1,116,131
$64.00
$4.75
$0.00
$2.58
$0.86
$81.68
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$1.27
$0.00
$0.00
$1.05
$1.05
$1.05
$4.58
$0.00
$3.44
$0.00
$0.00
$1.05
$0.87
$9.17
$0
$23.55
$4,987,661 $0TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS $105.22
EXHIBIT C: MORTGAGE SCHEDULE
Financing Alternative: 1
Perm. Mortg.Balance: $4,987,661 Const. Mort. Balance: $4,987,661
Interest Rate: 12.00% Construction Interest: 11.00%
Term: 15 Construction Points: 1.00%
Amortization Period: 30 Average out. Balance: 50%
Mortgage Payment: $615,644 Cash Flow/Lender: 0.00%
Residual/Lender: 0.00%
1 .2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Construction Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations
LOAN BALANCE $4,987,661 $4,969,562 $4,949,167 $4,926,186 $4,900,290 $4,871,110 $4,838,229 $4,801,178 $4,759,429 $4,712,384
AMORTIZATION $18,099 $20,395 $22,981 $25,896 $29,180 $32,881 $37,051 $41,750 $47,045
Total Amortization $328,288
INTEREST $597,545 $595,250 $592,663 $589,749 $586,464 $582,764 $578,594 $573,895 $568,600
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT D: PROJECTED STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
YEAR
ACTIVITY
GROSS REVENUES
LESS VACANCY RESERVE
NET REVENUES
LESS OPERATING EXPENSES
LESS REPLACEMENT RESERVE
1
Construction
2
Operations
$547,560
$27,378
$520,182
$138,329
$45,000
3
Operations
$580,414
$29,021
$551,393
$143,862
$45,000
4
Operations
$615,238
$30,762
$584,476
$149,396
$45,000
5
Operations
$652,153
$32,608
$619,545
$154,929
$45,000
6
Operations
$691,282
$34,564
$656,718
$160,462
$45,000
7
Operations
$732,759
$36,638
$696,121
$165,995
$45,000
8
Operations
$776,724
$38,836
$737,888
$171,528
$45,000
9
operations
$823,328
$41,166
$782,161
$177,061
$45,000
10
Operations
$872,727
$43,636
$829,091
$182,595
$45,000
11
Sale
$4,659,373
$53,011
$562,633
11
Sale
$925,091
$46,255
$878,837
$188,128
$45,000
NET OPERATING INCOME $0 $336,853 $362,531 $390,081 $419,616 $451,256 $485,126 $521,360 $560,100 $601,497 $645,709
MINUS PROJECT COSTS $4,987,661 $0
PLUS SALES PROCEEDS $6,282,297
CASH FLOW BEFORE DEBT ($4,987,661) $336,853 $362,531 $390,081 $419,616 $451,256 $485,126 $521,360 $560,100 $601,497 $6,928,006
SERVICE
YEAR
ACTIVITY
CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE
Principal Amount
Points
Interest
PERMANENT MORTGAGE
Principal Amount
Points
Fixed Debt Service
C.F.Before Part.
C.F.Participation
Debt Payment Upon Sale
Residual Participation
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE
(debt service,c.f.
and residual part.)
CASH FLOW AFTER DEBT
SERVICE
Debt Coverage Ratio
Breakeven Occupancy
Breakeven Occupancy w/
Partner Contribution
$4,987,661 ($4,987,661)
$0
$0
$4,987,661
$0
$615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644
$0 ($278,792) ($253,114) ($225,564) ($196,028) ($164,389) ($130,519) ($94,285) ($55,544) ($14,148) $6,312,361
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $6,312,361
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
$4,659,373
$0 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $615,644 $5,275,017
$0 ($278,792) ($253,114) ($225,564) ($196,028) ($164,389) ($130,519) ($94,285) ($55,544) ($14,148) $1,652,989
0.55
1.51
1.00
0.59
1.44
1.00
0.63
1.37
1.00
0.68
1.30
1.00
0.73
1.24
1.00
0.79
1.18
1.00
0.85
1.12
1.00
0.91
1.07
1.00
0.98
1.02
1.00
11.25
0.97
0.97
EXHIBIT E: AFTER TAX ANALYSIS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Construction Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Sale
NET OPERATING INCOME
DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSES
Less: Interest Payments
Interest
Less: Depreciation
Construction Period
Taxes
Interest
$0 $336,853 $362,531 $390,081 $419,616 $451,256 $485,126 $521,360 $560,100 $601,497
$0 $597,545 $595,250 $592,663 $589,749 $586,464 $582,764 $578,594 $573,895 $568,600
$215,085 $215,085 $215,085 $215,085 $215,085 $215,085 $215,085 $215,085 $215,085
$5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000
$43,458 $43,458 $43,458 $43,458 $43,458 $43,458 $43,458 $43,458 $43,458 $43,458
Leasing/Mkt. $100,000 $0
YEAR
ACTIVITY
$645,709
$562,633
$215,085
$5,000
$43,458
1
Indirect Expenses
Legal & Acc't.
Appraisals
Insurance
Permits
Consultants
Financing Fees
Const. Loan Fee
Const.Loan Points
Perm. Loan Points
TOTAL DEDUCTIBLE
PLUS REPLACEMENT RESERVE
TAXABLE INCOME (LOSS)
TAX LIABILITY (50%)
TAX SHELTER (50%)
$60,000
$0
$50,000
$0
$10,000
$0
$0
$2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755
$271,213 $863,844 $861,548 $858,962 $856,047 $852,763 $849,062 $844,892 $840,193 $834,898 $828,932
($0) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000)
($271,213) ($481,991) ($454,018) ($423,881) ($391,431) ($356,507) ($318,936) ($278,532) ($235,093) ($188,402) ($138,223)
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
$135,607 $240,995 $227,009 $211,940 $195,715 $178,253 $159,468 $139,266 $117,547 $94,201 $69,111
CAPITAL GAINS TAX
Sales Proceeds
Basis
Land
Building
Unamortized Expense
Points
Leasing Comissions
Net Gain
Tax Liability (20%)
$6,282,297
$450,000
$1,720,680
$11,022$0
$4,100,595
$820,119
AFTER-TAX CASH FLOW
(Leveraged)
Without Tax Benefits
With Tax Benefits
NET PRESENT VALUE
Without Tax Benefits
With Tax Benefits
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
Without Tax Benefits
With Tax Benefits
$0
$135,607
($542,003)
$479,894
-8.16%
N.A.
($278,792)
($37,796)
($253,114) ($225,564)
($26,105) ($13,623)
($196,028) ($164,389)
($313) $13,865
($130,519)
$28,949
($94,285)
$44,981
($55,544)
$62,002
($14,148)
$80,053
$832,870
$901,981
EXHIBIT V: FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY WITH A PARTICAPATION MORTGAGE
ALTERNATIVE #3
DEVELOPMENT PROFORMA: CENTRAL SQUARE HOUSING PROJECT
EXHIBIT A: GENERAL INFORMATION
DATE OF PROJECTION: August 1,1985
PROJECT NAME: CSR Project
LOCATION: Cambridge, Ma.
NUMBER OF UNITS: 45
EST. START DATE: 4/1/1988
COMPLETION DATE: 1/1/1990
CONSTRUCTION TIME: 20 months
A. SITE INFORMATION
Sqaure Footage of Parcel:
Bid. Gross Sqaure Footage:
BLd. Net Square Footage:
Building Efficiency:
No. of Parking Spaces:
27,376
47,400
38,520
81%
45
B. UNIT CHARACTERISTICS
Number of Units:
Total Sq. Feet:
No. of Studios:
Sq. Ft. per unit:
No. of (1) bedrm.
Sq. Ft. per unit:
No. of (2) bedrm.:
Sq. ft. per unit:
No. of (3) bedrm.:
Sq. Ft. per unit:
BASIS FOR PROJECTIONS
DEVELOPMENT PHASE
Land
Site Improvements
Building Construction
Parking
Consultants
Architectural & Engineering
Architectural Supervision
Development Fee
Legal and Accounting
Appraisal Fees
Permits
Marketing/Leasing
Insurance during Const.
R.E. Taxes during Const.
Contingency
Construction Loan Fee
Organizational Costs
$5,000.00
$0.00
$50,000.00 F
$58.00
$5,000.00
$10,000
3.75%
1.25%
0.00%
$60,000
$0
$0
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$182,962 5
$0
$0
per
er
er
per
per
unit
uni t
uni t
sq. feet
uni t
of const. cost
of const. cost
of const cost
% of total costs
OPERATIONS PHASE
MONTHLY REVENUES
Studio:
(1) bedroom:
(2) Bedroom:
(3) bedroom:
Parking Spaces:
TOTAL ANNUAL REVENUES:
ANNUAL EXPENSES
Administrative
Management:
Maintenance:
Real Estate Taxes:
Utilities:
(Common Area)
Utilities:
(Units)
Security:
$0
$820
$1,000$0
$50
$547,560
$5,000
$27,378
$10,951
$50,000
$10,000
per
per
per
per
per
uni t
uni t
unit
unit
space
5.00% of revenues
2.00% of revenues
$0 $0.00 per unit
$30,000
p. 9 1
45
47,400
0
0
9
660
36
905
0
0
Working Capital (Operating Deficits)
Letters of Credit Fees
Commissions
SALE:
Stabilized Cap Rate:
Disposition Cap Rate:
Sales Expense:
TAXATION:
Ordinary Income:
Capital Gains:
STABILIZED YEAR:
HOLDING PERIOD:
(years)
GENERAL PARTNER RATE OF RETURN
Before Tax:
After Tax:
LIMITED PARTNER RATE OF RETURN
After Tax:
$0
$0
$50,000
11.0%
9.0%
6.0%
Water:
TOTAL EXPENSES:
Replacement Res.
LEASING
Vacancy Rate:
(Annual)
Revenues: Lease-Up
Year
Reveues:Stabilized
Year
50%
20%
-2
10
10%
25%
25%
$5,000
$138,329
GROWTH FACTORS:
Market Rents
Operating Expenses
DISTRIBUTION TO LIMITED PARTNERS
Percent of Cash Flow:
Percent of Tax Benefits:
Percent of Residuals:
$3,073.98 per unit
$45,000
5% of gross revenues
100.00% of gross revenues
100.00% of gross revenues
6% per annum
4% per annum
45%
45%
45%
End of Year
Participation Mtg.; lender shares 50%
of cash flow and residuals
CONVENTION:
FINANCING:
EXHIBIT B: PROJECT COST ESTIMATE
YEAR
ITEM COST ESTIMATE
Land
Improvements
Building
Parking
Site Improvements
Arch. & Eng.
Architectural Supervision
Total Improvements
Consultants
Legal and Accounting
Appraisal Fees
Permits
Marketing/Leasing
Insurance during Const.
R.E. Taxes during Const.
Contingency
Construction Loan Fee
Development Fee
Organizational Costs
Working Capital (Operating Deficits)
Commissions
Points
Construction Interest
Letters of Credit
Total Indirect Costs
YR. 1
CONSTRUCTION
YR. 2
LEASING
COST PER SQUARE FOOT
$225,000
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$2,749,200
$225,000
$0
$111,533
$37,178
$3,347,910
$10,000
$60,000
$0
$0
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$182,962
$0
$0
$0
$0
$50,000
$41,332
$365,924
$0
$850,218
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$58.00
$4.75
$0.00
$2.35
$0.78
$70.63
$1.27$0.00
$0.00
$1.05
$1.05
$1.05
$3.86
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$1.05
$0.87
$7.72
$0
$17.94
$88.57$4,198,128 $0TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS
EXHIBIT C: MORTGAGE SCHEDULE
Financing Alternative: 4
Perm. Mortg.Balance: $4,198,128 Const. Mort. Balance: $4,198,128
Interest Rate: 10.00% Construction Interest: 11.00%
Term: 15 Construction Points: 1.00%
Amortization Period: 30 Average out. Balance: 50%
Mortgage Payment: $442,099 Cash Flow/Lender: 50.00%
Residual/Lender: 50.00%
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ACTIVITY Construction Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Sale
LOAN BALANCE $4,198,128 $4,174,792 $4,149,012 $4,120,532 $4,089,070 $4,054,314 $4,015,918 $3,973,502 $3,926,644 $3,874,880 $3,817,695
AMORTIZATION $23,336 $25,780 $28,480 $31,462 $34,756 $38,396 $42,416 $46,858 $51,764 $57,185
Total Amortization $380,434
INTEREST $418,762 $416,319 $413,619 $410,637 $407,343 $403,703 $399,683 $395,241 $390,335 $384,914
EXHIBIT D: PROJECTED STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSES
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ACTIVITY Construction Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Sale
GROSS REVENUES $547,560 $580,414 $615,238 $652,153 $691,282 $732,759 $776,724 $823,328 $872,727 $925,091
LESS VACANCY RESERVE $27,378 $29,021 $30,762 $32,608 $34,564 $36,638 $38,836 $41,166 $43,636 $46,255
NET REVENUES $520,182 $551,393 $584,476 $619,545 $656,718 $696,121 $737,888 $782,161 $829,091 $878,837
LESS OPERATING EXPENSES $138,329 $143,862 $149,396 $154,929 $160,462 $165,995 $171,528 $177,061 $182,595 $188,128
LESS REPLACEMENT RESERVE $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000
NET OPERATING INCOME $0 $336,853 $362,531 $390,081' $419,616 $451,256 $485,126 $521,360 $560,100 $601,497 $645,709
MINUS PROJECT COSTS $4,198,128 $0
PLUS SALES PROCEEDS $6,282,297
CASH FLOW BEFORE DEBT ($4,198,128) $336,853 $362,531 $390,081 $419,616 $451,256 $485,126 $521,360 $560,100 $601,497 $6,928,006
SERVICE
CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE
Principal Amount
Points
Interest
PERMANENT MORTGAGE
Principal Amount
Points
Fixed Debt Service
C.F.Before Part.
C.F.Participation
Debt Payment Upon Sale
Residual Participation
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE
(debt service,c.f.
and residual part.)
CASH FLOW AFTER DEBT
SERVICE
Debt Coverage Ratio
Breakeven Occupancy
Breakeven Occupancy w/
Partner Contribution
$4,198,128 ($4,198,128)
$0
$0
$4,198,128
$0
$442,099 $442,099 $442,099 $442,099 $442,099 $442,099 $442,099 $442,099 $442,099
$0 ($105,246) ($79,568) ($52,018) ($22,483) $9,157
$0 $0 $0 $0 $9,157
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $4,578
$43,027
$43,027
$21,513
$79,261
$79,261
$39,630
$118,001
$118,001
$59,001
$159,398
$159,398
$79,699
$442,099
$6,485,907
$2,668,212
$1,334,106
$3,817,695
$0 $442,099 $442,099 $442,099 $442,099 $446,677 $463,612 $481,729 $501,099 $521,798 $5,593,900
$0 ($105,246) ($79,568) ($52,018) ($22,483) $4,578 $21,513 $39,630 $59,001 $79,699 $1,334,106
0.76
1.19
1.00
0.82
1.14
1.00
0.88
1.08
1.00
0.95
1.03
1.00
1.02
0.99
0.99
1.10
0.94
0.94
1.18
0.90
0.90
1.27
0.86
0.86
1.36
0.82
0.82
15.67
0.78
0.78
EXHIBIT E: AFTER TAX ANALYSIS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Construction Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations operations Operations Operations Operations
NET OPERATING INCOME
DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSES
Less: Interest Payments
Interest
Contingent interest
Less: Depreciation
$0 $336,853 $362,531 $390,081 $419,616 $451,256 $485,126 $521,360 $560,100 $601,497
$0 $418,762 $416,319 $413,619 $410,637 $407,343 $403,703 $399,683 $395,241 $390,335
$0 $0 $0 $0
$185,995 $185,995 $185,995 $185,995
$4,578 $21,513 $39,630 $59,001 $79,699
$185,995 $185,995 $185,995 $185,995 $185,995
Construction Period
Taxes
Interest
Leasing/Mkt.
Indirect Expenses
Legal & Acc't.
Appraisals
Insurance
Permits
Consultants
$5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000
$36,592 $36,592 $36,592 $36,592 $36,592 $36,592 $36,592 $36,592 $36,592 $36,592
$100,000
$60,000
$0
$50,000
$0
$10,000
$0
YEAR
ACTIVITY
11
Sale
$645,709
$384,914
$1,334,106
$185,995
$5,000
$36,592
1
Financing Fees
Const. Loan Fee $0
Const.Loan Points $0
Perm. Loan Points $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755
TOTAL DEDUCTIBLE $264,348 $649,105 $646,662 $643,962 $640,980 $642,264 $655,560 $669,656 $684,585 $700,376 $1,949,363
PLUS REPLACEMENT RESERVE ($0) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000)
TAXABLE INCOME (LOSS) ($264,348) ($267,253) ($239,131) ($208,881) ($176,364) ($146,008) ($125,434) ($103,296) ($79,485) ($53,880) ($1,258,654)
TAX LIABILITY (50%) $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
TAX SHELTER (50%) $132,174 $133,626 $119,566 $104,441 $88,182 $73,004 $62,717 $51,648 $39,742 $26,940 $629,327
CAPITAL GAINS TAX
Sales Proceeds $6,282,297
Basis
Land $225,000
BuiLding $1,487,960
Unamortized Expense
Points $11,022
Leasing Comissions $0
Net Gain $4,558,315
Tax LiabiLity (20%) $911,663
AFTER-TAX - -CASH - -FLOW ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFTER-TAX CASH FLOW
(Leveraged)
Without Tax Benefits
With Tax Benefits
NET PRESENT VALUE
Without Tax Benefits
With Tax Benefits
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
Without Tax Benefits
With Tax Benefits
$0
$132,174
$39,675
$355,747
12.81%
N.A.
($105,246) ($79,568) ($52,018)
$28,380 $39,997 $52,423
($22,483)
$65, 699
$4,578 $21,513 $39,630
$77,583 $84,230 $91,279
$59,001
$98,743
$79,699
$106, 639
$422,443
$1,051,770
EXHIBIT VI: FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY WITH SHARP AND TAX-EXEMPT FINANCING
ALTERNATIVE #4
DEVELOPMENT PROFORMA: CENTRAL SQUARE HOUSING PROJECT
EXHIBIT A: GENERAL INFORMATION
DATE OF PROJECTION: August 1, 1985
PROJECT NAME: CSR Project
LOCATION: Cambridge, Ma.
NUMBER OF UNITS: 45
EST. START DATE: 4/1/1988
COMPLETION DATE: 1/1/1990
CONSTRUCTION TIME: 20 months
A. SITE INFORMATION
Sqaure Footage of Parcel:
BLd. Gross Sqaure Footage:
BLd. Net Square Footage:
Building Efficiency:
No. of Parking Spaces:
27,376
47,400
38,520
81%
45
B. UNIT CHARACTERISTICS
Number of Units:
Total Sq. Feet:
No. of Studios:
Sq. Ft. per unit:
No. of (1) bedrm.
Sq. Ft. per unit:
No. of (2) bedrm.:
Sq. ft. per unit:
No. of (3) bedrm.:
Sq. Ft. per unit:
BASIS FOR PROJECTIONS
DEVELOPMENT PHASE
Land
Site Improvements
Building Construction
Parking
Consultants
Architectural & Engineering
Architectural Supervision
Development Fee
Legal and Accounting
Appraisal Fees
Permits
Marketing/Leasing
Insurance during Const.
R.E. Taxes during Const.
Contingency
Construction Loan Fee
Organizational Costs
$10,000.00
$0.00
$50,000.00
$58.00
$5,000.00
per
per
per
per
per
unit
unit
unit
sq. feet
unit
$10,000
3.75% of const. cost
1.25% of const. cost
10.00% of const cost(SH
$60,000
$0
$0
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$207,599 5% of total costs
$0
$0
ARP
OPERATIONS PHASE
MONTHLY REVENUES
Studio:
(1) bedroom:
(2) Bedroom:
(3) bedroom:
Parking Spaces:
TOTAL ANNUAL REVENUES:
ANNUAL EXPENSES
Administrative
Management:
Maintenance:
Real Estate Taxes:
Uti Li ties:
(Common Area)
Utilities:
(Units)
Security:
$0
$820
$1,000
$0
$50
$547,560
$5,000
$27,378
$10,951
$50,000
$10,000
$0
$30,000
per
per
per
per
per
unit
uni t
unit
unit
space
5.00% of revenues
2.00% of revenues
$0.00 per unit
p. 9 7
45
47,400
0
0
9
660
36
905
0
0
Working Capital (Operating Deficits)
Bond Issuance Costs
Commissions
SALE:
Stabilized Cap Rate:
Disposition Cap Rate:
Sales Expense:
TAXATION:
Ordinary Income:
Capital Gains:
STABILIZED YEAR:
HOLDING PERIOD:
(years)
GENERAL PARTNER RATE OF RETURN
Before Tax:
After Tax:
LIMITED PARTNER RATE OF RETURN
After Tax:
$0
2.00% of
$50,000
11.0%
9.0%
6.0%
total costs
50%
20%
2
10
20%
10%
20%
Water:
TOTAL EXPENSES:
Replacement Res.
LEASING
Vacancy Rate:
(Annual)
Revenues: Lease-Up
Year
Reveues:Stabilized
Year
GROWTH FACTORS:
Market Rents
Operating Expenses
DISTRIBUTION TO LIMITED PARTNERS
Percent of Cash Flow:
Percent of Tax Benefits:
Percent of Residuals:
$5,000
$138,329 $3,073.98 per unit
$45,000
5% of gross revenues
100.00% of gross revenues
100.00% of gross revenues
6% per annum
4% per annum
0%
0%
0%
End of Year
Tax-exempt bonds w/ SHARP subsidy
10%, 30 years
CONVENTION:
FINANCING:
EXHIBIT B: PROJECT COST ESTIMATE
YEAR
ITEM COST ESTIMATE
Land
Improvements
Building
Parking
Site Improvements
Arch. & Eng.
Architectural Supervision
Total Improvements
YR. 1
CONSTRUCTION
YR. 2
LEASING
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
COST PER SQUARE FOOT
$450,000
$2,749,200
$225,000
$0
$111,533
$37,178
$3,572,910
$58.00
$4.75
$0.00
$2.35
$0.78
$75.38
Consultants $10,000
Legal and Accounting $60,000
Appraisal Fees $0
Permits $0
Marketing/Leasing $50,000
Insurance during Const. $50,000
R.E. Taxes during Const. $50,000
Contingency $207,599
Construction Loan Fee $0
Development Fee $390,958
Organizational Costs $0
Working Capital (Operating Deficits) $0
Commissions $50,000
Points $0
Construction Interest $309,069
Bond Issuance Costs $95,011
Total Indirect Costs $1,262,636
$4,835,546 $0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$1.27
$0.00
$0.00
$1.05
$1.05
$1.05
$4.38
$0.00
$8.25
$0.00
$0.00
$1.05
$0.00
$6.52
$0
$24.63
TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS $100.01
EXHIBIT C: MORTGAGE SCHEDULE
Financing Alternative: 2
Perm. Mortg.Balance: $4,365,497 Const. Mort. Balance: $4,365,497
Interest Rate: 10.00% Construction Interest: 11.00%
Term: 15 Construction Points: 1.00%
Amortization Period: 30 Average out. Balance: 50%
Mortgage Payment: $459,724 Cash Flow/Lender: 50.00%
Residual/Lender: 50.00%
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ACTIVITY Construction Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Sale
LOAN BALANCE $4,365,497 $4,341,230 $4,314,422 $4,284,807 $4,252,091 $4,215,949 $4,176,022 $4,131,915 $4,083,189 $4,029,361 $3,969,896
AMORTIZATION $24,267 $26,808 $29,615 $32,716 $36,142 $39,926 $44,107 $48,726 $53,828 $59,465
Total Amortization $395,600
INTEREST $435,457 $432,916 $430,109 $427,008 $423,582 $419,798 $415,617 $410,998 $405,896 $400,260
EXHIBIT D: PROJECTED STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSES
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ACTIVITY Construction Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Sale
GROSS REVENUES $547,560 $580,414 $615,238 $652,153 $691,282 $732,759 $776,724 $823,328 $872,727 $925,091
LESS VACANCY RESERVE $27,378 $29,021 $30,762 $32,608 $34,564 $36,638 $38,836 $41,166 $43,636 $46,255
NET REVENUES $520,182 $551,393 $584,476 $619,545 $656,718 $696,121 $737,888 $782,161 $829,091 $878,837
LESS OPERATING EXPENSES $138,329 $143,862 $149,396 $154,929 $160,462 $165,995 $171,528 $177,061 $182,595 $188,128
LESS REPLACEMENT RESERVE $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000
NET OPERATING INCOME $0 $336,853 $362,531 $390,081 $419,616 $451,256 $485,126 $521,360 $560,100 $601,497 $645,709
MINUS PROJECT COSTS $4,835,546 $0
PLUS SALES PROCEEDS $6,282,297
CASH FLOW BEFORE DEBT ($4,835,546) $336,853 $362,531 $390,081 $419,616 $451,256 $485,126 $521,360 $560,100 $601,497 $6,928,006
SERVICE
CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE
Principal Amount
Points
Interest
PERMANENT MORTGAGE
Principal Amount
Points
Fixed Debt Service
C.F.Before Part.
C.F.Participation
Debt Payment Upon Sale
Residual Participation
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE
(debt service,c.f.
and residual part.)
CASH FLOW AFTER DEBT
SERVICE AND EQUITY
Maximum Publi Subsidy
Minus Rental Assistance
Plus Public Subsidy
(Accrued SHARP p. & i.)
Sharp Repayment
CASH FLOW AFTER PUBLIC
SUBSIDY AND RENT.ASSIST.
$4,365,497 ($4,365,497)
$0
$0
$4,365,497
$0
$459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724
($470,050) ($122,872) ($97,194) ($69,643) ($40,108) ($8,468) $25,402 $61,636 $100,376 $141,772 $6,468,282
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $25,402 $61,636 $100,376 $141,772 $6,468,282
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
$3,969,896
$0 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $459,724 $4,429,621
($470,050) ($122,872) ($97,194) ($69,643) ($40,108) ($8,468) $25,402 $61,636 $100,376 $141,772 $2,498,385
($79,092)
$178,505
$0 $55,788 $55,788 $55,788 $55,788 $55,788 $55,788 $55,788 $55,788 $55,788 $55,788
($79,092)
$178,505
$187,430
$0
$178,505
$384,232
$0
$153,634
$564,760
$0
$124,099
$723,302
$0
$92,459
$856,549
$0
$58,589
$960,896
$0
$0$1,008,940
$0
$0
$1,059,387
$1,043,003
$0
$1,095,153
$1,037,372
$0
$1,089,240
$1,089,240
($154) $25,523 $28,203 $28,203 $28,203 $28,203 $5,848 $28,203 $28,203 $1,353,357
Debt Coverage Ratio 1.00 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.01 1.10 1.19 14.95
Breakeven Occupancy 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85
Breakeven Occupancy w/
Partner Contribution 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85
EXHIBIT E: AFTER TAX ANALYSIS
YEAR
ACTIVITY
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Construction Operations Operations Operations operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Sale
NET OPERATING INCOME
DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSES
Less: Interest Payments
Interest
Less: Depreciation
Construction Period
Taxes
Interest
$0 $281,065 $306,743 $334,293 $363,828 $395,468 $429,338 $465,572 $504,312 $545,709
$0 $435,457 $432,916 $430,109 $427,008 $423,582 $419,798 $415,617 $410,998 $405,896
$198,495 $198,495 $198,495 $198,495 $198,495 $198,495 $198,495 $198,495 $198,495
$5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000
$30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907
$589,921
$400,260
$198,495
$5,000
$30,907
1
Leasing/Mkt.
Indirect Expenses
Legal & Accit.
Appraisals
Insurance
Permits
Consultants
Financing Fees
Const. Loan Fee
Const.Loan Points
Perm. Loan Points
TOTAL DEDUCTIBLE
PLUS REPLACEMENT RESERVE
TAXABLE INCOME (LOSS)
TAX LIABILITY (50%)
TAX SHELTER (50%)
$100,000 $0
$60,000
$0
$50,000
$0
$10,000
$0
$0
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
$255,907 $669,859 $667,318 $664,511 $661,410 $657,984 $654,200 $650,019 $645,400 $640,298 $634,662
($0) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000)
($255,907) ($343,795) ($315,576) ($285,218) ($252,582) ($217,516) ($179,862) ($139,447) ($96,088) ($49,590) $259
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $130
$127,953 $171,897 $157,788 $142,609 $126,291 $108,758 $89,931 $69,724 $48,044 $24,795 $0
CAPITAL GAINS TAX
Sales Proceeds
Basis
Land
Building
Unamortized Expense
Points
Leasing Comissions
Net Gain
Tax Liability (20%)
$6,282,297
$450,000
$1,587,960
$0
$0
$4,244,337
$848,867
AFTER-TAX CASH FLOW
(Leveraged)
Without Tax Benefits
With Tax Benefits
NET PRESENT VALUE
Without Tax Benefits
With Tax Benefits
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
Without Tax Benefits
With Tax Benefits
($79,092) ($154) $25,523 $28,203 $28,203 $28,203
$48,862 $171,743 $183,311 $170,812 $154,494 $136,961
$28,203
$118,134
$5,848
$75,571
$28,203 $28,203 $1,353,227
$76,247 $52,998 $1,353,227
$184,514
$1,236,930
42.67%
N.A.
EXHIBIT VII: FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY WITH TELLER BONDS
ALTERNATIVE #6
DEVELOPMENT PROFORMA: CENTRAL SQUARE HOUSING PROJECT
EXHIBIT A: GENERAL INFORMATION
DATE OF PROJECTION:
PROJECT NAME:
LOCATION:
NUMBER OF UNITS:
EST. START DATE:
COMPLETION DATE:
CONSTRUCTION TIME:
August 1,1985
CSR Project
Cambridge, Ma.
45
4/1/1988
1/1/1990
20 months
A. SITE INFORMATION
Sqaure Footage of Parcel:
Bid. Gross Sqaure Footage:
Bld. Net Square Footage:
Building Efficiency:
No. of Parking Spaces:
27,376
47,400
38,520
81%
45
B. UNIT CHARACTERISTICS
Number of Units:
Total Sq. Feet:
No. of Studios:
Sq. Ft. per unit:
No. of (1) bedrm.
Sq. Ft. per unit:
No. of (2) bedrm.:
Sq. ft. per unit:
No. of (3) bedrm.:
Sq. Ft. per unit:
BASIS FOR PROJECTIONS
DEVELOPMENT PHASE
Land
Site Improvements
Building Construction
Parking
Consultants
Architectural & Engineering
Architectural Supervision
Development Fee
Legal and Accounting
Appraisal Fees
Permits
Marketing/Leasing
Insurance during Const.
R.E. Taxes during Const.
Contingency
Construction Loan Fee
Organizational Costs
$5,000.00
$0.00
$50,000.00
$58.00
$5,000.00
per
per
per
per
per
unit
unit
unit
sq. feet
unit
$10,000
3.75% of const. cost
1.25% of const. cost
0.00% of const cost'
$60,000
$0
$0
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$178,396 5% of total costs
$0
$0
OPERATIONS PHASE
MONTHLY REVENUES
Studio:
(1) bedroom:
(2) Bedroom:
(3) bedroom:
Parking Spaces:
TOTAL ANNUAL REVENUES:
ANNUAL EXPENSES
Administrative
Management:
Maintenance:
Real Estate Taxes:
Utilities:
(Common Area)
Uti lities:
(Units)
Security:
$0
$820
$1,000
$0
$50
$547,560
$5,000
$27,378
$10,951
$50,000
$10,000
per
per
per
per
per
uni t
unit
unit
unit
space
5.00% of revenues
2.00% of revenues
$0 $0.00 per unit
$30,000
p.10 3
45
47,400
0
0
9
660
36
905
0
0
Working Capital (Operating Deficits)
Bond Issuance Costs
Commissions
SALE:
Stabilized Cap Rate:
Disposition Cap Rate:
Sales Expense:
TAXATION:
Ordinary Income:
Capital Gains:
STABILIZED YEAR:
HOLDING PERIOD:
(years)
$0
7.00% of total costs
$50,000
11.0%
9.0%
6.0%
50%
20%
2
10
Water:
TOTAL EXPENSES:
Replacement Res.
LEASING
Vacancy Rate:
(Annual)
Revenues: Lease-Up
Year
Reveues:Stabilized
Year
GROWTH FACTORS:
Market Rents
Operating Expenses
$5,000
$138,329
$45,000
$3,073.98 per unit
5% of gross revenues
100.00% of gross revenues
100.00% of gross revenues
6% per annum
4% per annum
GENERAL PARTNER
Before Tax:
After Tax:
LIMITED PARTNER
After Tax:
CONVENTION:
FINANCING:
RATE OF RETURN
RATE OF RETURN
Tax-exempt
30 years
20%
10%
DISTRIBUTION TO LIMITED PARTNERS
Percent of Cash Flow:
Percent of Tax Benefits:
Percent of Residuals:
20%
End of Year
TELLER bonds, 8%
39%
39%
39%
EXHIBIT B: PROJECT COST ESTIMATE
YEAR
ITEM COST ESTIMATE
Land
YR. 1
CONSTRUCTION
YR. 2
LEASING
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
COST PER SQUARE FOOT
$225,000
Improvements
Building
Parking
Site Improvements
Arch. & Eng.
Architectural Supervision
Total Improvements
$2,749,200
$225,000
$0
$111,533
$37,178
$3,347,910
$58.00
$4.75
$0.00
$2.35
$0.78
$70.63
Consultants $10,000
Legal and Accounting $60,000
Appraisal Fees $0
Permits $0
Marketing/Leasing $50,000
Insurance during Const. $50,000
R.E. Taxes during Const. $50,000
Contingency $178,396
Construction Loan Fee $0
Development Fee $0
Organizational Costs $0
Working Capital (Operating Deficits) $0
Commissions $50,000
Points $41,332
Construction Interest $309,069
Bond Issuance Costs $290,269
Total Indirect Costs $1,079,066
$4,426,976 $0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$1.27
$0.00
$0.00
$1.05
$1.05
$1.05
$3.76
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$1.05
$0.87
$6.52
$0
$16.64
$87.27TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS
EXHIBIT C: MORTGAGE SCHEDULE
Financing Alternative: 2
Perm. Mortg.Balance: $4,426,976 Const. Mort. Balance: $4,426,976
Interest Rate: 8.00% Construction Interest: 11.00%
Term: 15 Construction Points: 1.00%
Amortization Period: 30 Average out. Balance: 50%
Mortgage Payment: $389,803 Cash Flow/Lender: 50.00%
Residual/Lender: 50.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Construction Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations operations Operations Operations Operations Sale
11
LOAN BALANCE
AMORTIZATION
Total Amortization
$4,426,976 $4,389,995 $4,349,944 $4,306,569 $4,259,594 $4,208,720 $4,153,623 $4,093,954 $4,029,332 $3,959,346
$36,981 $40,051 $43,375 $46,975 $50,874 $55,097 $59,670 $64,622 $69,986
$543,424
INTEREST $352,822 $349,752 $346,428 $342,828 $338,929 $334,706 $330,133 $325,181 $319,817 $314,009
.....................................................................................................................
EXHIBIT 0: PROJECTED STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSES
YEAR
ACTIVITY
GROSS REVENUES
LESS VACANCY RESERVE
NET REVENUES
LESS OPERATING EXPENSES
LESS REPLACEMENT RESERVE
1 2
Construction Operations
$547,560
$27,378
$520,182
$138,329
$45,000
NET OPERATING INCOME $0 $336,853 $362,531 $390,081 $419,616 $451,256 $485,126 $521,360 $560,100 $601,497 $645,709
MINUS PROJECT COSTS $4,426,976 $0
PLUS SALES PROCEEDS $6,282,297
................................ ................... I............................~..................................
CASH FLOW BEFORE DEBT ($4,426,976) $336,853 $362,531 $390,081 $419,616 $451,256 $485,126 $521,360 $560,100 $601,497 $6,928,006
SERVICE
YEAR
ACTIVITY
$3,883,552
$75,794
3
Operations
$580,414
$29,021
$551,393
$143,862
$45,000
Operations
$615,238
$30,762
$584,476
$149,396
$45,000
5
Operations
$652,153
$32,608
$619,545
$154,929
$45,000
6
Operations
$691,282
$34,564
$656,718
$160,462
$45,000
7
Operations
$732,759
$36,638
$696,121
$165,995
$45,000
8
Operations
$776,724
$38,836
$737,888
$171,528
$45,000
9
Operations
$823,328
$41,166
$782,161
$177,061
$45,000
10
Operations
$872,727
$43,636
$829,091
$182,595
$45,000
11
Sale
$925,091
$46,255
$878,837
$188,128
$45,000
CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE
Principal Amount
Points
Interest
PERMANENT MORTGAGE
Principal Amount
Points
Fixed Debt Service
C.F.Before Part.
C.F.Participation
Debt Payment Upon Sale
Residual Participation
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE
(debt service,c.f.
and residual part.)
CASH FLOW AFTER DEBT
SERVICE
Minus Rental Assistance
Plus Public Subsidy
$4,426,976 ($4,426,976)
$0
$0
$4,426,976
$0
$389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803
$0 ($52,950) ($27,272)
$0 $0
$0 $0
$389,803 $389,803
$278 $29,813 $61,453 $95,323 $131,557 $170,297 $211,694 $6,538,203$278 $29,813 $61,453 $95,323 $131,557 $170,297 $211,694 $6,538,203
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
$3,883,552
$0 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $389,803 $4,273,355
$0 ($52,950) ($27,272) $278 $29,813 $61,453 $95,323 $131,557 $170,297 $211,694 $2,654,651
$0 $30,720 $30,720 $30,720 $30,720 $30,720 $30,720 $30,720 $30,720 $30,720 $30,720
CASH FLOW AFTER PUBLIC
SUBSIDY AND RENT. ASSISTANCE ($83,670) ($57,992) ($30,442) ($907) $30,733 $64,603 $100,837 $139,577 $180,974 $2,623,931
Debt Coverage Ratio 0.79 0.85 0.92 1.00 1.08 1.17 1.26 1.36 1.46 1.61
Breakeven Occupancy 1.16 1.11 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.75
Breakeven Occupancy w/
Partner Contribution 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.75
EXHIBIT E: AFTER TAX ANALYSIS
YEAR 2
ACTIVITY
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Construction Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Operations Sale
NET OPERATING INCOME
DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSES
Less: Interest Payments
Interest
Less: Depreciation
Construction Period
Taxes
Interest
$0 $306,133 $331,811 $359,361 $388,896 $420,536 $454,406 $490,640 $529,380 $570,777
$0 $352,822 $349,752 $346,428 $342,828 $338,929 $334,706 $330,133 $325,181 $319,817
$185,995 $185,995 $185,995 $185,995 $185,995 $185,995 $185,995 $185,995 $185,995
$614,989
$314,009
$185,995
$5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000$30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907 $30,907
Leasing/Mkt. $100,000 $0
1
Indirect Expenses
Legal & Acc't. $60,000
Appraisals $0
Insurance $50,000
Permits $0
Consultants $10,000
Financing Fees
Const. Loan Fee $0
Const.Loan Points $0
Perm. Loan Points $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755 $2,755
TOTAL DEDUCTIBLE $258,662 $577,479 $574,410 $571,085 $567,485 $563,586 $559,364 $554,791 $549,838 $544,475 $538,666
PLUS REPLACEMENT RESERVE ($0) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000) ($45,000)
TAXABLE INCOME (LOSS) ($258,662) ($226,346) ($197,599) ($166,724) ($133,589) ($98,050) ($59,958) ($19,151) $24,542 $71,302 $121,323
TAX LIABILITY (50%) $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $12,271 $35,651 $60,661
TAX SHELTER (50%) $129,331 $113,173 $98,799 $83,362 $66,794 $49,025 $29,979 $9,575 $0 $0 $0
CAPITAL GAINS TAX
Sales Proceeds $6,282,297
Basis
Land $225,000
Building $1,487,960
Unamort i zed Expense
Points $11,022
Leasing Comissions $0
Net Gain $4,558,315
Tax Liability (20%) $911,663
AFTER-TAX CASH FLOW
(Leveraged)
Without Tax Benefits $0 ($83,670) ($57,992) ($30,442) ($907) $30,733 $64,603 $100,837 $127,306 $145,323 $2,563,270
With Tax Benefits $129,331 $60,223 $71,527 $83,640 $96,608 $110,478 $125,302 $141,132 $158,026 $176,043 $1,682,327
NET PRESENT VALUE
Without Tax Benefits $338,192
With Tax Benefits $1,255,234
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
Without Tax Benefits 44.55%
With Tax Benefits N.A.
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NOTES
1. Interview with Donald Tofias of Central Plaza Realty
Trust on May 16, June 20 and July 19,1985.
2. Letter from Stephen I. Burr of Herrick and Smith to
Arnold B. Tofias, June 10,1985.
3. Interview with Donald Tofias, June, 20,1985.
4. Interview with Fred Kramer of ADD, Inc., June 22,1985.
5. Telephone interview with Anne Whittington, Program
Officer, Cambridge Community Development Department, August
3,1985.
6. Telephone interview with Anne Whittington, August 3,1985.
7. Interview with Michael Rosenberg, Assistant Director for
Housing, Cmabridge Community Development Department, June
26,1985.
8. Interivews with the following brokers: a) Helen Moulton
of Ellis and Andrews, July 30,1985; b) Davis Rally of with
Hunaman, July 15,1985; c) Brendan Noonan, July 28,1985; and
4) O'Neil Ingram and Tod Beatty of Ingram, Rettig and
Beatty, July 23, 1985.
9. Telephone interview with Susan Theil of the Cambridge
Rent Control Office, July 28,1985.
10. Interview with Joseph Antenelli, Senior Site Evaluation
Officer of Massachusetts Housing Financing Agency, July 11,
1985.
11. Interview with Leslie Watt, Project Manager for the Winn
Development Company, July 9, 1985.
12. Interviews with: 1) Helen Moulton, July 30,1985; 22)
Davis Rally, July 15,1985; 3) Brendan Noonan, July 28,1985
and 4) Tod Beatty, July 23, 985.
13. Letter from Stephen I. Burr of Herrick and Smith to
Arnold B. Tofias, June 10,1985 and telephone interview with
Donald Tofias, August 13,1985.
14. Telephone interview with Anne Whittington, August
3,1985.
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15. Interview with Bobert Mervis, Staff Director of the
Cambridge Rent Control Office, July 19,1985.
16. Cambridge Election Commission, Rules for Counting
Ballots under Proportional Representation, City of
Cambridge, 1941.
17. Interview with Robert Mervis, July 19,1985.
18. Interview with Donald Tofias and members of the
Neighborhood Four Coalition, July 10,1985.
19. Interview with Leslie Watt, July 9,1985.
20. Telephone interviews with Kent Hitechew, Assistant Vice
President, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., July 15, 1985 and
David Smith, Vice President, Boston Financial Technology
Group, August 5,1985.
21. Telephone interview with Kent Hitechew, July 15, 1985.
22. Telephone interview with Kent Hitechew, August 1,1985
and David Smith, August 5,1985.
23. Telephone Interview with David Smith, August 8,1985.
24. Telephone interview with Tony Wallace, Multifamily
Representative, Department of Housing and Urban Development
Area Office, July 19,1985.
25. Interview with Mark Williams, Mulitfamily Housing
Consultant, June 29, 1985.
26. Interview with Mark Williams, June 29, 1985.
27. The following sources were used for this section: a)
telephone interviews with Paul Burbine, Director of Finance,
Massachussetts Housibf Finance Agency, July 17 and August 1,
1985; b) Interview with Mark Williams on July 14, July 29
and August 6, 1985; c) Massachussetts Housing Finance
Agency, Program Guidelines, State Housing Assistance for
Rental Production, January 25,1985.
28. The following sources were used for this section: a)
Telephone interviews with Mark Draiser, Program
Representative, Executive Office of Communities and
Development, July 7, 1985 and July 25,1985; b) Interviews
with Mark Williams July 26; c) Executive Office of
Communtiies and Development, Tax exempt Local Loans to
Encourage Rental Housing Program, April 19,1985.
29. Telephone interview with Kent Hitechew, July 15, 1985.
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30. Telephone interview with Kent Hitechew, August 1,1985.
31. Telephone Interview with David Smith, August 6, 1985 and
Mark Williams, July 28,1985.
32. Telephone interview with Stephen Wasco, Director of
Multifamily Housing, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, August 8,1985.
33. Telephone interview with Kent Hitechew, August 3,1985.
34. Interview with Mark Williams, July 18,1985.
35.The following source was used for this section:
telephone interview with Paul Burbine, August 2,1985.
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